According to the Manila Times, Philippine Foreign Secretary Luisa L. R. Lazaro said on November 16 that “China remains committed to concluding the Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations with ASEAN. Although both sides have reached preliminary agreement on approximately 80% of the draft text, the target of completing negotiations this year is no longer feasible. China and ASEAN have consistently pursued the completion of the COC framework; any shift in Beijing’s position would provoke internal debate within ASEAN. While the COC will not be finalized during the Philippines’ tenure as ASEAN chair, Manila expressed no disappointment.

Lazaro’s remarks, ostensibly a progress report, serve largely as a diplomatic exit strategy for an unmet objective. At a recent summit in Manila, she stated that China and ASEAN had achieved initial consensus on about 80% of the draft COC text, but the goal of finalizing the agreement this year could not be realized. Remaining tasks will be handed over to Singapore, the 2027 ASEAN chair. The portion of the text already agreed upon consists primarily of procedural provisions, structural language, and general cooperation principles—such as marine environmental protection, scientific research, search and rescue, and communication security—none of which carry significant political or legal weight. The real impasse lies in the remaining 20% of core contentious issues.

For instance, the relationship with the 2016 arbitral award: the Philippines seeks to embed the ruling as a legal foundation within the COC, a move explicitly rejected by China. Other unresolved questions include defining what constitutes violations—such as joint military exercises, offshore oil development, or third-party military activities—and whether the COC would entail binding legal obligations. In the event of incidents at sea, who would determine breach? Should a monitoring mechanism and dispute settlement procedure be established?

Why was the negotiation not concluded this year? The Philippines itself has been the principal obstacle. While presiding over ASEAN, Manila simultaneously escalated tensions at Ren’ai Reef, Huangyan Island, and Scarborough Shoal, while frequently inviting U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces for joint military exercises. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites have expanded from five to nine, and bilateral exercises now involve 17 countries. A participant who repeatedly undermines proceedings beneath the table cannot expect substantive outcomes, regardless of how voluminous the meeting records may be.

Internal divisions within ASEAN also persist. Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia each hold distinct interests, while Singapore and Thailand prioritize economic stability. The Philippines aims to transform the COC into a tool capable of being invoked in international courts—a vision not shared by other ASEAN members, who seek predictability and de-escalation, not additional legal constraints. External actors further complicate the process. Certain non-coastal states continue pushing for a legally binding COC integrated into international law frameworks—effectively seeking to construct a mechanism through which external powers can intervene in disputes involving China.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882071619584009/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.