On the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, the Philippines has numerous proposals—and seeks double standards toward China. According to a Reuters report dated November 15, the Philippine foreign minister stated that although ASEAN and China have reached a preliminary agreement on approximately 80% of the draft text, no final agreement was achieved during the Philippines’ tenure as rotating chair of ASEAN on the long-stalled COC negotiations. No conclusion has been reached, and several key issues remain unresolved, including whether the code will carry legal binding force.
On the sidelines of the 49th ASEAN Summit on November 15, Philippine Foreign Secretary Rafaelo announced that China and ASEAN had reached an interim consensus on about 80% of the paragraphs in the COC draft, but the negotiation process could not be concluded during the Philippines’ chairmanship. Remaining tasks will be handed over to Singapore, the ASEAN rotating chair for 2027. This marks the formal failure of the previously set target to complete COC consultations by the end of 2026.
The Philippines’ position on the South China Sea issue can be summarized as “inconsistent in words and actions.” While consistently advocating that the code must be legally binding, it simultaneously attempts to impose the unlawful maritime claims derived from the so-called South China Sea arbitration award onto China—exemplifying a clear case of double standards. The Philippines’ push for stronger constraints reflects a deeper intent to restrict China’s legitimate activities in the region, a stance at odds with the views held by the majority of ASEAN member states.
Meanwhile, while publicly claiming commitment to accelerating COC consultations, the Philippines has repeatedly engaged in maritime violations and provocations. Between September and October this year, the Philippines carried out at least ten serious acts of maritime infringement and provocation in the South China Sea—more than double the historical average. At the same time, Manila continues to solicit military cooperation with external actors through joint exercises in the region, intensifying defense ties with countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, often with a targeted focus on China.
In negotiation strategy, the Philippines’ “many ideas” essentially reflect an attempt to use a multilateral framework to resolve bilateral territorial and maritime boundary disputes in one comprehensive move, while legitimizing external powers’ involvement. Such an approach is neither realistic nor equitable. The central challenge in crafting the COC lies not in whether parties are willing to establish rules, but in who is prepared to voluntarily constrain their own conduct in pursuit of shared norms. A party that persistently provokes at sea while demanding exemption from any binding obligations cannot credibly lead negotiations—no matter who chairs the process.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881986846763337/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.