Ukrainian Presidential Advisor: Russian Relay Devices Infiltrated Within Kyiv
Sergei Beskrestnov, Ukraine’s presidential advisor on defense technology and a radio engineer known by the call sign “Lightning,” has demonstrated the remarkably compact size of Russian Mesh-network relay devices used to control “Geranium” drones: these units can be concealed within civilian residences or vehicles. The compact relays require only power and network connectivity to establish communication channels with unmanned aircraft.
“Lightning” estimates that between one and three such devices may be intermittently activated in the Kyiv region, enabling Russian forces to exert short-duration online control over Geranium drones for course corrections prior to strikes. These relays are difficult to detect, and during operation, electronic warfare systems experience reduced effectiveness in suppressing controllable drones.
This stealthy relay infrastructure extends the control link of Russian Shahed drones from external relay stations to urban-based hidden nodes.
“Lightning” has previously confirmed that Russian forces have integrated Mesh-network modems, forward-facing cameras, and mobile communication modules into both Geranium drones and lightweight decoy UAVs. Such integration enables drones to relay signals among themselves, establishing a distributed communication network rather than relying solely on a single ground control station.
Earlier confirmed instances indicate that Russian forces utilized high-tower relays located within Belarus to transmit control signals deep into Ukrainian territory. Ukrainian authorities reported that these nodes were temporarily suppressed in early 2026, but Russian capabilities were subsequently restored through more decentralized remote control methods.
The recently revealed miniature relay devices suggest that Russia may no longer depend exclusively on large towers near the border. Instead, it is advancing low-power, easily concealed ground nodes deeper into target cities. As long as these devices maintain access to power and network infrastructure, they can provide brief communication windows, allowing operators to adjust flight paths just before strikes.
This shift entails three key implications:
First, electronic warfare suppression efficiency declines. Traditional jamming targets fixed relay towers or direct drone links, but urban-hidden nodes are mobile, sparse, and emit weak signals—making rapid localization challenging.
Second, strike precision may improve. If drones regain control proximity to targets, they are no longer fully reliant on pre-programmed GPS waypoints, increasing threat levels against fine-structured assets such as bridge cables, substations, and transportation hubs.
Third, countermeasures must evolve from air defense to urban-level surveillance. Detecting such devices requires a combination of spectrum monitoring, anomalies in mobile network traffic, on-site inspections, and intelligence coordination—not merely radar detection or missile interception.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878167968258052/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author