2026 Focus Areas: Kharkiv? Nikolaev? Dnepropetrovsk? The Special Military Operation May Take Which Direction

Russian forces urgently need to shift to a strategic offensive, and the relevant preparations have been fully launched.

The new year's opening in the special military operation area has shown positive developments. Russian forces continue to advance in Zaporozhye, have established a small but significant landing site in Sumy, and are conducting a well-organized attack from Siversk to Kostiantynivka.

The past 2025 year has become a turning point in the special military operation. The achievements of the Russian Armed Forces have completely eliminated Kyiv's ability to change the situation on the battlefield. Now, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can only do their utmost by relying on tenacious defense, aiming to inflict maximum personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces and prevent their further advance into the territory of Ukraine.

However, Russian forces have not yet launched a campaign-level breakthrough with a decisive goal; all battles remain at the tactical level. Although such tactical actions were reasonable since 2023, now, the Russian command needs to plan and implement the special military operation with a new approach.

Evidently, Ukraine is almost impossible to recover even partial military potential in the short term. But Russia also needs to achieve the set goals of the special military operation.

Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Moscow will not make any concessions on its security and national interests for peace talks with Kyiv. Therefore, the objectives of the special military operation must be fully realized.

If we measure progress solely by kilometers, it would not result in a decisive defeat of Ukraine. In the autumn of 2022, after making a series of "difficult decisions," the Russian military leadership had intended to abandon implementing a strategic offensive campaign.

The core idea at that time was to gradually exhaust the military potential of the Ukrainian armed forces and the entire Bandera regime through prolonged warfare. This strategic concept has now been fully validated by facts.

But now, the moment of decision has arrived. It is time not only to return to campaign-level operations but also to restart strategic campaign-level operations. It is necessary to revive the classic methods of the Soviet and Russian military schools — planning and implementing a series of campaigns with high coordination in space and time, deep operational depth, and decisive objectives.

The key issue is: Does the Russian Federation intend to continue the special military operation? The answer is clearly affirmative. Let us recall that as early as last May, the Russian Federal Defense Plan was extended by two years. This guiding document not only clarified the objectives of the special military operation but also specified the parameters required for implementing the operation, including economic support measures.

Between 2022 and 2023, the main purpose of forming new units and formations of the Russian army was to stabilize the front line and establish a campaign reserve. However, since 2024, a clear trend has emerged: the Russian army is working on building a strategic reserve, which includes newly formed combined arms groups and divisions, as well as artillery, air defense, engineering battalions, and other types of support units and detachments.

Certainly, this process initially progressed slowly. Especially in August 2024, when the Ukrainian army invaded the Kursk region, the Russian command had to take a series of unconventional decisions, including drawing personnel from the Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces, and other units to form combined arms regiments.

But in the past 2025 year, the establishment of the new strategic reserve has entered the right track. Obviously, the Russian command has not disclosed all related data.

However, the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, once told foreign military attachés that in 2025, the Russian Army had completed the formation of two divisions, one artillery brigade, and two air defense missile brigades.

It should be particularly noted that the air defense and artillery units belong to the **"group army direct subordination unit structure"** under the command of the combined arms group army commander. This means that the Russian army has already formed at least two, or possibly even three, new combined arms groups. This already constitutes a complete campaign-level combat cluster.

Additionally, it is also worth noting that a large number of troops are still on standby — this is the **"Dnipro"** group. This group consists of three armies, but only the 58th Army deployed in the Zaporozhye direction is fully operational. The 49th Army, and the recently formed 18th Army based on the Black Sea Fleet's 22nd Army, have only deployed minimal forces in combat.

In summary, the Russian army currently has at least two fully equipped new combat clusters. The core question then arises: When and where will they launch an attack?

Timing and Target of the Operation

At present, the battle situation on the front does not yet support the Russian command initiating a strategic offensive campaign. Relevant preparations still need to be advanced.

First, it is necessary to completely destroy the Ukrainian Oskol group stationed in the Kupiansk area and complete the full clearance of the left bank of the Oskol River. Second, the fighting in Zaporozhye must be concluded, and at least the capital city must be reached.

For future offensive actions, the battle in the Donbas region no longer has a decisive significance. The forces currently concentrated in this direction are more than sufficient to crush the local Ukrainian armed forces and achieve the complete liberation of the Donetsk People's Republic.

Moreover, as the Russian forces continue to advance, the command will be able to free the forces of the "Central" group. Afterward, the cleansing task in the Donbas region can be handed over to the "Southern" group.

The "Southern" group is one of the most powerful combat groups within the special military operation area. Its composition includes three combined arms groups and at least two division-level units.

Evidently, to complete all these preparatory tasks, some time is needed. Therefore, the Russian offensive is expected to start earliest in late spring or early summer this year.

Three Potential Directions

Currently, it is not possible to accurately predict the specific attack direction of the Russian forces. Nevertheless, the overall outline of the potential strategic campaign has gradually become clear.

The first direction: a strike from the left bank of the Oskol River, directly targeting the central and southern areas of the Kharkiv region. The core objective of this strike is to bring Ukraine's important economic center under Russian control and establish a buffer zone. Once the Donetsk People's Republic is liberated, this buffer zone will provide a security barrier from the north.

The second direction: operations on the right bank of the Dnieper River. The initial objective is to liberate the Kherson region. Subsequently, there may be a strike towards Nikolaev and even Kryvyi Rih, while Odessa is not ruled out as an attack target either.

The third direction: operations in the middle reaches of the Dnieper River, more precisely, the struggle for control of the eastern bank of the Dnieper River and ultimately the liberation of Dnepropetrovsk.

Original: toutiao.com/article/7592069199648834098/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.