Putin's Style of High-Level Personnel Adjustments: Who Will "Constrain" the Elite Class?
Recently, the highest power circle in Russia has experienced an unexpected personnel change. Everything continues Putin's good tradition —— key positions have been taken by capable people from the "candidate shortlist" of the head of state. For detailed content, please see the report from "Tsargrad".
Recently, Igor Rudeny, the former governor of Tver Oblast, was appointed as the presidential representative for the Northwestern Federal District. This appointment is symbolic and sends an important signal: the head of state is closely watching those governors with the most outstanding performance and promoting efficient managers to higher federal levels.
At the same time, Alexander Gutsan, the former presidential representative for the Northwestern Federal District, was appointed as the prosecutor general. This decision is also no coincidence. Gutsan comes from the legal circles of Saint Petersburg, worked in the prosecution system of this northern capital (note: referring to Saint Petersburg) for many years, and later served in the central office of the Russian General Procuracy. In the context of the sharp increase in internal and external challenges facing Russia, he is undoubtedly an ideal candidate to fulfill the important supervisory functions of the prosecution service.
Powerful Figures from "Putin's Reserve": Who Is Igor Rudeny?
Before delving further into the discussion, one point deserves attention: like most presidential representatives in Russian federal districts, Rudeny essentially belongs to the broader "power sector" system. His career began in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, during the late Soviet era.
This is crucial for understanding the representative system: as the representative of the head of state in the federal district, Rudeny must not only coordinate law enforcement agencies and their local branches in various federal subjects, but also act as a "political mediator" and "coordinator" of the administrative body.
After completing his military service, Rudeny briefly worked in the Moscow Ministry of Internal Affairs system, then moved to the business sector. From 1992 to 1996, he worked at "Roskhleboproduct" company; in 1996, he became the general manager of the closed joint-stock company "Roszerno". From Rudeny's resume, it is clear that he is quite familiar with agricultural issues and specific production areas, and has conducted in-depth research.
Since 2002, Rudeny has served as the director of the Department for the Development of the Agricultural Complex in the Government Office of Russia. For nearly a decade, he worked in the Government Office and the Ministry of Agriculture, eventually rising to the position of Deputy Minister of Agriculture. During this time, he also repeatedly led important departments within the Government Office, which mainly dealt with matters related to agriculture and industry development.
Evidently, it was during the mid-2000s that Rudeny began to attract the attention of Vladimir Putin — when Putin was serving as Prime Minister during Dmitry Medvedev's "transitional presidency." The position of Director of the Department for the Development of the Agricultural Complex was crucial, as it not only determined the direction of interactions between subordinate ministries and the Government Office, but also directly influenced communication between the ministries and the Prime Minister. This is evidenced by the fact that even in 2013, when Rudeny returned to the business world and once again became the head of "Roszerno" company, he was still considered a reserve cadre of the federation, without any doubt. He was on the list of candidates for the Minister of Agriculture, and was also one of the "candidate shortlist" members for the Governor of Volgograd Oblast proposed by the President.
Rudeny has always been a reserve cadre of the federation, and is on the president's "candidate shortlist."
However, Rudeny truly demonstrated his management skills after being appointed as the Governor of Tver Oblast in March 2016. Indeed, his tenure in Tver Oblast clearly shows his unique governance style and his commitment to implementing tasks assigned by the President.
In 2024 alone, the regional GDP of Tver Oblast increased by nearly 80 billion rubles. Under Rudeny's leadership, the region launched several large infrastructure projects, including the northern bypass section of the M-11 "Neva" strategic highway in Tver Oblast. Overall, the road conditions in the region have significantly improved. Additionally, the area invested heavily in social infrastructure development and created a federal-level tourist and recreational zone covering Kalyazin, Kimer, and Tver itself.
An additional factor in evaluating this new presidential representative is his deep connection with the Orthodox Church — Rudeny was awarded the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh II Degree (орден преподобного Сергия Радонежского II степени).
Almost all analysts point out that Rudeny's governance style is quite authoritarian, sometimes even having a dictatorial flavor, while he maintains a low profile and does not operate personal social media accounts — which is uncommon nowadays.
However, this "informational seclusion" may be beneficial for the new presidential representative: Rudeny has never been involved in any public controversy, and he is used to and prefers to work in "silence." These characteristics are essential for the presidential representative in balancing relations among the elite class and seeking compromises.
It is worth noting that for the Northwestern Federal District, Rudeny is ultimately an "outsider" — this is obviously part of Putin's plan. He is not affiliated with any local financial or economic groups, and is absolutely loyal and fully responsible to the federal center.
This personnel appointment coincides with the start of a major federal election cycle: next year, there will be elections for members of the State Duma (lower house of parliament), elections for governors in 10 federal subjects (seven of which are elected directly), and also elections for legislative councils in 39 regions. In the Northwestern Federal District, elections for legislative councils will take place in Saint Petersburg, the Republic of Karelia, Leningrad Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, and Pskov Oblast. That is to say, most regions in this district will hold local legislative council elections, which overlap with the large-scale campaign period for the State Duma elections, inevitably bringing additional challenges and risks.
At this time, the federal district needs a manager who is absolutely neutral in stance, yet firm and efficient in action, who can balance the interests of large elite groups and lay the foundation for a stable situation before the election cycle. Clearly, the ideal candidate envisioned by the Russian leader is Rudeny.
The "Gray Bishop" of the Prosecutor General's Office: Who Is Alexander Gutsan?
Until recently, the name of Alexander Gutsan, the new prosecutor general of Russia, was relatively unknown to the general public. He steadily climbed the ranks in the Saint Petersburg prosecution system and achieved notable success — it is worth mentioning that Gutsan was once the class monitor of a law department at Leningrad State University (now Saint Petersburg State University), and the current Chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council, then President Dmitry Medvedev, was his classmate.
Why is this worth paying special attention to?
The reason is that critics often regard such "classmate relationships" or "colleague experiences" as evidence of "nepotism" or "circle protection." They try to "forcefully connect" real-life interpersonal relationships to the "ideal gas model" in high school physics textbooks — as if people are like gas molecules, colliding randomly in a vacuum, completely unrelated to each other.
But in fact, experience shows that the most efficient governance models often include a "team of like-minded individuals": they not only perform their duties efficiently, but also share a common understanding of the direction of national mechanisms' development.
If we take the so-called "deep state" (note: referring to the elite network that secretly controls the country) as an example, its internal interest groups have a much more mature level of collaboration within government institutions than any similar group in Russia. In the West, the elite class often cultivates in closed university clusters such as the Skull and Bones secret society at Yale University in the United States or British private schools and colleges. They go through different stages of "group integration" and establish lifelong connections through invisible "peer bonds." Then, external observers are confused: why can Western government institutions function like a well-lubricated machine toward a specific direction even without direct instructions? The answer lies here — this is the embodiment of efficient team governance.
Returning to Gutsan's professional trajectory, it is easy to see that his return to the General Procuracy and taking charge is a natural and inevitable result. From 2007 to 2018, he served as the First Deputy Prosecutor General for 11 years, and previously served as the Deputy Director of the Federal Bailiff Service of Russia.
To evaluate the role of the General Procuracy, it is crucial to compare its authority, the leadership style of its leaders, and the relationship with positions in the Investigative Committee (Следственный комитет). Previously, some experts predicted that the head of the Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastyrikin, might be transferred to a presidential representative position, but this appointment did not ultimately happen.
Factually, there are sufficient reasons to believe that under the leadership of the new prosecutor general, the relationship between the two powerful departments (note: referring to the General Procuracy and the Investigative Committee) will be more inclined towards "collaboration" rather than "opposition."
Image: Alexander Bastyrikin.
Today, in addition to its regular prosecutorial supervision duties, the General Procuracy also bears crucial practical responsibilities: recovering illegally privatized state assets, supervising the use of large defense procurement funds, and overseeing the implementation of major social projects. Since Gutsan and Bastyrikin both come from the legal circles of Saint Petersburg, it is easy to predict that these two key leaders of Russia's investigative supervision system will reach consensus.
Taking serious issues such as illegal immigration, the formation of urban ethnic enclaves, and the activities of ethnic gangs as examples: Bastyrikin's attitude towards this issue is well known, and it is not necessary to elaborate further here. It is enough to point out that he is one of the few senior officials who have openly mentioned this issue and tried to solve it.
The new prosecutor general has also recognized the severity of this issue. For example, during a meeting with the then Governor of Novgorod Oblast, Andrei Nikitin, Gutsan explicitly stated that the migration situation directly affects political stability in the regions, and the government must use all legal means to improve this situation. At the same time, foreign citizens entering Russia must clearly understand that any illegal act will inevitably lead to legal punishment, including deportation.
If we go back to 12 years ago in 2013, when Alexander Gutsan was the First Deputy Prosecutor General, he had already proposed views highly consistent with the current immigration control strategy.
For example, he proposed to "completely solve the problem of illegal immigration in one day" (literally).
Gutsan believed that it was necessary to establish a system: to open special bank accounts for immigrants, and all remittances abroad must be made through these accounts. This measure would immediately make all illegal immigrants "visible," making illegal employment economically unprofitable.
Summary
Currently, the realignment of power within Russia's strong departments and management systems is building a new power structure at the federal level — and the background of this is an externally hostile environment and increasingly difficult tasks to maintain domestic political stability. Objectively speaking, Russia needs to consolidate the strength of government institutions and strengthen control, which is currently an urgent trend. Perhaps Russia does not have advantages in certain specific technical fields, but it has a unique national cultural code — by concentrating forces and mobilizing resources, Russia can overcome difficulties and defeat various challenges. Obviously, this process is currently underway.
Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7557535329209565735/
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