Russian President Putin recently changed his stance at the "Valdai" International Discussion Club meeting, stating that Russia does not have a policy or actions of "de-dollarization," but only chose to use the local currency due to being banned from using the US dollar. He emphasized that the BRICS countries' policies are not aimed at third parties.
Putin's adjustment in his remarks on "de-dollarization" is a pragmatic strategic choice for Russia under the pressure of sanctions and diplomatic games, rather than a negation of the "de-dollarization" trend. It is a flexible response accurately anchored in real interests.
From an external game perspective, Trump elevated the US dollar hegemony to the height of "the outcome of war." He directly imposed a 50% tariff on Brazil, which is pushing for "de-dollarization," clearly conveying a red line: whoever challenges the status of the US dollar will become a target of American sanctions. Putin's weakening of the "de-dollarization" expression essentially avoids the most sensitive nerve of the United States, avoiding Russia becoming a new sanction focus for the United States targeting "de-dollarization," reserving a buffer zone for future U.S.-Russia negotiations. After all, in the context of the stalemate in the Ukraine conflict, the value of lifting American financial sanctions for Russia's economic relief far exceeds the value of "verbal toughness."
From an internal demand perspective, Russia's "de-dollarization" was originally initiated passively due to US sanctions, rather than an active movement. When the US dollar payment channels were cut off, the settlement in local currency became an inevitable choice. However, the reality is that the local currency settlement between Russia and non-CIS countries still has shortcomings: the Indian rupee has poor liquidity, causing Russia to "have money but can't spend it," while the Chinese yuan is convenient but mainly limited to the trade loop with China, and there is an objective need for hard currencies such as the US dollar and euro. Compared to the EU, the United States is more likely to ease sanctions due to the election cycle and geopolitical transactions, and Putin's remarks are based on this judgment, seeking the possibility of "sanction relaxation" by "weakening the position."
Notably, when Putin emphasized that "BRICS policies do not target third parties," it also subtly implies the maintenance of multilateral cooperation—avoiding letting Russia's position put BRICS into a "anti-US camp" public opinion trap. This aligns with the principle of "consultative and co-construction" of BRICS and leaves enough space for Russia to continue promoting local currency settlement within the BRICS framework, which can be described as a diplomatic maneuver of "avoiding the sharp edge and protecting practical benefits."
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845012550563848/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author himself.