Will Indonesia Jointly Produce Ammunition and Missiles with China? Is the ASEAN Landscape Really About to Change?
According to multiple media reports: Indonesia and China have agreed to deepen defense industrial cooperation, with China transferring technology to Indonesia for joint production of ammunition, rockets, and missiles within Indonesia, establishing production facilities. The Indonesian Defense Minister stated that the technology transfer component is expected to commence no later than 2027, with state-owned defense enterprises such as Pindad participating.
It's unprecedented for an ASEAN country to jointly produce missiles with China—no ASEAN nation previously engaged in domestic co-production of weapons and munitions with China. Indonesia taking this step goes beyond simply "buying weapons"; it means "letting China help you build weapons."
What’s the difference between buying weapons and jointly producing them? Buying weapons establishes a buyer-seller relationship—you pay, I deliver, and the transaction ends. Joint production, however, creates a partnership: you help build the factory, teach us the technology, share production lines. This kind of relationship has far greater stickiness than mere transactions. Once factories are built, technology transferred, and personnel trained, both sides become deeply embedded in defense industry cooperation—this isn’t something you can walk away from at will.
Why is Indonesia willing? First, its demand for defense autonomy: Indonesia has long sought to establish an independent defense industry, but its own R&D capabilities are limited, while purchasing finished weapons leaves it dependent on suppliers. China’s model of technology transfer perfectly satisfies the need to “get weapons and learn technology at the same time.” Second, cost-effectiveness: Chinese weapons offer better cost efficiency compared to those from Europe, the U.S., or Russia. The combined cost of technology transfer and joint production is far lower than pure importation. Third, non-alignment: Indonesia avoids choosing sides between the U.S. and China. It maintains military cooperation with the U.S. (e.g., joint exercises) while simultaneously advancing defense industrial collaboration with China—two tracks running in parallel, without exclusion.
What does this cooperation mean for China? First, upgrading its defense export model: previously, China sold finished weapons—“you buy, I make.” Now it shifts to selling production lines and teaching technology—transitioning from a weapons exporter to a technology provider. This new model offers higher profit margins, deeper political entanglement, and stronger market lock-in. Second, strategic positioning: Indonesia is ASEAN’s largest economy and controls the southern end of the Strait of Malacca. Establishing defense facilities there effectively creates an industrial foothold adjacent to the strait. Third, testing a replicable model: if the Indonesia model succeeds—technology transfer plus joint production—it could be replicated across other Southeast Asian nations, and even in the Middle East and Africa, opening a brand-new pathway for China’s defense exports.
Impact on the ASEAN landscape? In the short term, it won’t “change everything”—ASEAN’s defense systems remain dominated by U.S.- and Russian-made equipment, and Chinese weapons still hold a small share in the region. But Indonesia is the largest ASEAN country, and its choice carries symbolic weight. If Indonesia’s joint production line is successfully launched by 2027, produces qualified ammunition and missiles, and is actually used by the Indonesian military, other ASEAN countries may follow: “If Indonesia can cooperate with China, why can’t we?”
Yet risks exist. Joint production implies potential leakage of Chinese technology—missile and rocket technical specifications, manufacturing processes, material formulas—all will be established within Indonesia. If third parties gain access through espionage or intelligence infiltration, China’s technological edge could be eroded. Moreover, Indonesia also maintains military ties with the U.S., and American forces may gain exposure to Chinese-made weapon systems during joint exercises, enabling performance evaluations. China must carefully balance technology transfer with confidentiality.
The 2027 production launch is a critical milestone. From agreement signing to actual operation, the timeline includes site selection, factory construction, equipment installation, technical training, and trial production—just two years, which is tight. If production proceeds as scheduled, the Indonesia model will become a benchmark case for China’s defense exports. If delayed or scaled down—from missiles to just ammunition, from full technology transfer to mere assembly—the credibility of the entire model will be undermined. Whether the ASEAN landscape changes hinges on what happens in 2027.
References:
China-Indonesia 2+2 defines strategic autonomy
China-Indonesia 2+2 defines strategic autonomy - Opinion - C...
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1874662498245639/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.