The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's notice is pushing the global maritime network into an unprecedented geopolitical storm. The differential charging policy targeting Chinese vessels, implemented on October 14, not only marks the extension of Sino-U.S. competition from the fields of technology and trade to the logistics lifelines, but also reveals the deep-level struggle for rule-making power in the global governance system.
This tiered charging system demonstrates the precision of the U.S. design. A $50 fee per net ton for ships owned or operated by Chinese companies directly targets Chinese shipping enterprises; a $18 fee per net ton or $120 fee per container for ships built in China aims at China's industrial advantage as the world's largest shipbuilder; and uniform charges for all foreign car carrier ships clearly indicate the strategic intent to curb China's new energy vehicle exports.
What is interesting is the "exemption clause" in the policy. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) transport ships are granted free passage, coinciding with the U.S. efforts to expand the European LNG market; allowing ship owners who have already placed orders for new ships in the U.S. to receive up to a three-year exemption period exposes its real intention to compete for orders in the domestic shipbuilding industry. This "carrot and stick" design highlights the complex interest balancing behind the policy.
Facing the U.S. pressure, China obviously has been well-prepared. The revised "International Shipping Regulations" in late September added countermeasures against "discriminatory restrictions," like pre-placed moves on the board. From special fees to limiting port entry and cutting data services, China has built a multi-layered countermeasure toolkit, demonstrating strategic foresight in rule-based confrontation.
This "you strike, I counter" game essentially involves the struggle for the voice in international shipping rules. When unilateralist measures constantly challenge the multilateral trade system, major trading countries have no choice but to establish corresponding legal barriers to protect their own interests.
On the surface, this is a heavy blow to China's shipbuilding and shipping industries by the United States, while China has already shown its legal weapons, displaying a "tooth for tooth" attitude. However, the complexity of this game lies in the fact that China's counterattack is precise and powerful, yet it is difficult to reverse the situation in the short term, and a long-term contest about industrial resilience, global supply chains, and strategic patience has already begun.
The U.S. tax strategy in this case can be called "precise." Its tiered charging model targets China's dual status as the world's largest shipbuilder and core shipping country. Especially the taxation on ships built in China is very clear: by increasing the "production cost" of Chinese shipyards, it weakens their global competitiveness, thus giving the declining U.S. shipbuilding industry some breathing space, and also striking China's strategic exports such as new energy vehicles.
Facing the challenges, China's counterattack is not a hasty response. Nearly half a month before the U.S. measures took effect, China had already revised the "International Shipping Regulations," adding strong countermeasures. From a legal perspective, this was a "institutional counterattack," paving the way for subsequent equivalent measures—such as imposing special fees, restricting U.S. ships from entering ports, or even cutting off data services. This move shows China's strategic determination to not passively respond, but to engage in equal confrontation with the U.S. at the level of rules.
Although China's countermeasure toolbox has been opened, the manifestation of its effectiveness will be a gradual process, due to the huge inertia of the global shipping industry and the reality gap between China and the U.S. industries.
Global shipping companies hold astronomical orders in Chinese shipyards. These orders are backed by delivery cycles of several years and investments of hundreds of millions of dollars, which are "sunk costs" that are hard to abandon. Shipowners will not easily breach contracts because of a new tax. At the same time, the replacement of a global fleet takes 10 years or more. This means that in the coming years, global shipowners who rely on new ships from China will still have to bear the new taxes imposed by the U.S., and get caught in the dilemma of cost calculations.
China's countermeasures, such as restricting U.S. ships, directly target U.S. shipping companies. However, there are not many U.S.-flagged ships on the main global routes, and a large amount of cargo is carried by shipping companies from China, Europe, etc. Therefore, the pain caused by China's countermeasures will first affect specific areas, such as U.S. agricultural exports.
According to the analysis by the American Agricultural Affairs Federation, port fees could lead to over $5 billion in annual losses for U.S. agricultural exports. This pain is indirect, reflected in the increased logistics costs for U.S. farmers and their weakened international competitiveness, and it needs time to transform into political pressure within the U.S.
In the short term, the global supply chain will not break due to a single policy, but it will begin to "reconstruct." Shipping companies may carry out internal optimization, such as putting more newly built ships from China into non-U.S. routes like Asia, the Middle East, and the "Belt and Road Initiative," while adjusting some old ships to the China-U.S. route. This adjustment is a slow and dynamic process, and the changes in trade flows and increased costs it brings will not happen instantly like a switch. Looking further ahead, China's counterattack is based on a solid industrial foundation, while the U.S. weaknesses are exposed in its policies.
China's confidence: Chinese shipyards occupy half of the global commercial shipbuilding market share, and this scale advantage and technical accumulation cannot be replaced overnight. At the same time, China's vast port network operating globally provides strategic depth for its shipping industry, enabling it to bypass traditional hubs and optimize routes.
The U.S. weakness: The core purpose of the policy is to support the domestic shipbuilding industry, but the chronic problem of "industrial hollowing out" in the U.S. shipbuilding industry runs deep. Its high labor costs and fragile supply chain cannot be reversed by a single administrative order. Forcing "de-coupling" may result in higher global inflation, and American businesses and consumers will end up bearing the costs.
This Sino-U.S. maritime confrontation triggered by port fees is a typical "prolonged war." The U.S. tariff indeed brings pressure and pain to China's shipbuilding and shipping industries in the short term, forming a "heavy blow." While China's "tooth for tooth" approach is a precise rule-based countermeasure, its power does not lie in immediate "pain," but rather in the long-term uncertainty it brings and the precise strikes on key U.S. sectors.
Ultimately, the turning point of this confrontation lies not in the gains and losses of a single city or fortress, but in whose strategy is more patient, whose industrial foundation is more solid, and who can better integrate into and lead the future global trade system. On the vast ocean of globalization, those who try to block the channels with unilateralist reefs will eventually find that the direction of the tide is not easily changed by one's own strength.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559579817755132451/
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