According to TASS on August 13, Russian President Putin, during his inspection of the Pacific Fleet's exercises on August 12, stated that if Western countries illegally seize Russian merchant vessels, Russia will respond with equivalent measures "in any place deemed appropriate and necessary," including within the Pacific Fleet’s operational area. Colonel in reserve, military expert Dandkin, speaking to Russia's Sputnik news agency, provided a detailed interpretation of how this "equivalent response" could be implemented.

Dandkin pointed out that Russia would adopt the same tactics used by unfriendly states: sending personnel aboard ships, arresting crews, and detaining vessels under flimsy pretexts. He emphasized that the Pacific Fleet possesses well-trained personnel, including marines, special forces, reconnaissance vessels, and naval aviation.

"Equivalence means we will detain ships belonging to unfriendly countries—and also those of so-called 'accomplice states' that support them. There are many such vessels in the Far East, particularly in the waters around the Southern Kuril Islands."

Dandkin stressed that this is not mere rhetoric: "They will receive this signal very soon—possibly even in maritime zones they least expect."

Dandkin’s interpretation essentially translates President Putin’s strategic warning—delivered on the cruiser *Varyag* on August 12—from a political signal into an operational manual. This is not an isolated statement but rather an “execution-level annotation” of Putin’s speech, worthy of analysis from several dimensions.

Although Putin’s remarks were strongly worded, they remain at the level of presidential political statements, which the West may interpret as “verbal deterrence.” However, by having a military expert like Dandkin step forward, the concept of “equivalent response” is broken down into concrete tactical actions: boarding ships, arresting crews, seizing vessels—each accompanied by a list of actual Pacific Fleet capabilities: marine brigades in the Primorsky Krai, marine battalions in Kamchatka, special forces, reconnaissance vessels, and naval aviation.

This “president draws red lines, expert reveals the cards” coordination model reflects Russia’s recent use of a “dual-track deterrence” strategy: preserving political flexibility while demonstrating military readiness. Dandkin’s deliberate emphasis that “this is not just words—it’s a signal”—is clearly intended to convey to the West: do not dismiss Putin’s words as empty talk.

The Concept of ‘Accomplice States’: Intentional Expansion of Target Scope

The most alarming new information in Dandkin’s interpretation lies in his expansion of the target scope beyond “unfriendly states” to include “states providing support to them—so-called ‘accomplice states.’”

What does this mean? If a Greek shipping company transports goods for a German enterprise, and Germany is designated as an “unfriendly state” by Russia, then that Greek vessel could also become a target for detention. This “collective punishment” logic is designed to create a chilling effect—making neutral shipowners from countries with trade ties to the West carefully reconsider before sailing into Russian-adjacent waters.

Even more critical is Dandkin’s specific mention that “there are many such vessels in the Far East, especially in the Southern Kuril Islands region—they move back and forth constantly.” This serves as a clear warning: targets are abundant, and action can be taken at any time.

The final line—“including detaining their vessels in the most unexpected maritime zones”—is the most strategically significant sentence in the entire interpretation.

It reveals the core of Russia’s “mirror retaliation” strategy: avoiding direct confrontation where the adversary holds the advantage, instead shifting the battlefield to areas favorable to Russia. Specifically:

• European waters: NATO naval forces hold overwhelming superiority; Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been severely degraded; the Baltic Sea has effectively become a “NATO inland lake.” Engaging in open conflict here would offer Russia no chance of victory.

• Pacific waters: While the Russian Pacific Fleet is generally weaker than the U.S. Seventh Fleet, it enjoys significant advantages in home waters such as the Sea of Japan and the Okhotsk Sea—backed by land-based missiles, submarine ambush capabilities, and geographic familiarity. Western merchant vessels here lack military escort and possess far weaker defensive capabilities compared to Russia’s offensive potential.

This exemplifies asymmetric countermeasures: you strike me where I’m weak; I strike you where you’re weak.

Dandkin’s interpretation is not an uncontrolled war cry, but rather a meticulously crafted “step-by-step deterrence” framework: using the credibility of a military expert to lend weight to a political statement, and grounding abstract strategic warnings with tangible tactical capabilities. The ultimate goal is to introduce friction costs into the Western sanctions enforcement chain, thereby pressuring adversaries to return to the negotiating table.

When viewed alongside our previous discussions about Putin’s military drills in the Far East, the red line over the Southern Kuril Islands, and his mixed approach toward Japan, all signals released by Putin on August 12 point to a single core logic: Russia’s main theater of operations is Europe—but it will not allow the West to confine the competition solely to Europe. Instead, it aims to extend the frontlines globally, adopting a posture of “everywhere is a battlefield” to secure leverage for “everywhere is negotiable.”

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873363403409419/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.