Iran Holds the Cards to Counter the United States
The other strait of vital importance to global trade, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, could be blocked. At least the Houthi movement in Yemen has made related threats. But why has this clearly Iran-friendly organization not yet taken military action against the United States?
The current war that the United States is waging against Iran is essentially a matter of survival for this Islamic republic. For this reason, the Iranian authorities (unlike the military operations in spring 2025) are using all means for self-defense. They not only directly attack military targets of the United States and its allies, but also mobilize forces they call "the best friends" — that is, the proxy forces within what is known as the "resistance axis." This axis consists of movements and armed networks in the Middle East that are organized and/or funded by Iran, which serve to advance Iranian interests during peacetime and fight on Iran's side during wartime.
Several members of this axis have responded to the call. The Lebanese Hezbollah and multiple armed groups in Iraq have joined the conflict, launching a series of attacks on Israeli and American targets. However, the Houthi movement in Yemen has so far remained on the sidelines.
Certainly, Iranian state media claim that the Houthis are in full combat readiness. The Houthi side supports Iran morally through statements and street demonstrations, but has not yet entered into actual combat.
According to their own words, the timing is not yet right. "Our fingers are always ready to pull the trigger when the situation requires it," said the leader of the movement, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Not long ago, he repeatedly stated that if Iran were attacked, the Houthis would give a "quick and strong response."
At the same time, the Houthis are not just an ordinary member of the resistance axis. Their combat potential makes them a core force within the axis.
First, this is reflected in the combat quality of their personnel.
Yemenis who can survive in extreme natural environments have been regarded as the finest warriors among Arabs since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and this status continues today. This is also why Saudi Arabia, a powerful country, has been unable to defeat them in ten years after declaring war on them in 2015.
Additionally, the strength of the Houthis stems from geographical advantages. They are not only adjacent to key Saudi oil fields, allowing them to bomb them at any time with missiles and drones, but also control the exit from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. In short, they can block all shipping through the Suez Canal — one of the core arteries of global trade.
Despite having a large arsenal (including hypersonic missiles), the Houthis have not yet launched any bombing or implemented any blockade, even though they have declared their intention to block the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.
"The obvious restraint of the Houthis has surprised those who see them merely as puppets of Iran or a belligerent group."
It was noted by the Atlantic Council in the United States.
There are currently multiple explanations for this restraint, and it is not ruled out that several reasons may apply simultaneously.
First, there is no obligation to participate. Unlike the Lebanese and Iraqi armed groups, the Houthis do not recognize the Supreme Leader of Iran having the "guardianship of the jurist" (which grants him authority over them), so they are not required to obey Iran.
At the same time, unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis are not a 100% subordinate institution of Iran, but rather more like an ally or hired helper. Iran is indeed the core partner of the Houthis, but in recent years, the Houthis have also found new protectors. These entities are committed to controlling global trade routes (not only to protect them), fully recognizing the strategic importance of Yemen, and actively investing in it.
Second, due to fear. "Although closely linked to the Iran axis, this group is in a different geographical and political environment, and faces complex internal and regional factors, so any decision to join the war is more cautious," pointed out Qatar Al Jazeera. One reason is that the Houthis do not control the entire territory of Yemen, and they do not want to take actions that could lead to a united front against themselves across the Middle East and the world.
Therefore, for example, they will not recklessly bomb oil fields of Arab countries. It is one thing to strike targets based on the principle of self-defense (Saudi Arabia had formally fought against Yemen), and another thing to act when Riyadh has not attacked any side and officially remains outside the conflict. "Saudi Arabia funds armed factions in Yemen, which are waiting for the opportunity to overthrow the Houthis' rule in northern Yemen. If the Houthis make a wrong move, it will give these factions an opening," said Nadav Sivan of the Hudson Institute.
Protesting against Israel's genocide in Gaza, and blocking the Red Sea under the name of global Muslim protests is one thing, while joining the war now, when only a few Muslim countries officially support Iran, and even the people of Yemen are not entirely supportive of Iran, is another thing.
"The Houthi involvement in the Gaza conflict has increased their international prestige and earned them the support of widespread forces in Yemen that back Palestine. However, the willingness of Yemenis to support Iran is much lower — many Yemenis view this resource-rich country as another foreign power interfering in their domestic affairs," wrote the Atlantic Council. In 2025, the U.S.-Israel joint strike destroyed the Houthi weapons stockpile and eliminated some senior officials (including cabinet members). The Houthi movement has not yet fully recovered, and a new war could further worsen their situation.
Finally, the third point is that Iran has not urgently demanded their participation. Iran is very clear that in such a complex conflict, it cannot reveal all its cards at once, and must keep a backup plan — for example, to deal with situations where the opponent increases pressure.
"Unless Tehran believes that the survival of the Iranian regime is in imminent danger, and other strategies are not sufficient to exert enough pressure on Washington, it is unlikely to use this method," the U.S. Middle East Institute analyzed. Or it could be used when it needs to exert large-scale pressure on Washington (such as cutting off global trade) to end the conflict.
Currently, Iran does not need such pressure. Due to multiple reasons including internal, external, religious, and electoral factors, the Iranian authorities have clearly decided to drag the United States into the quagmire of the Middle East conflict. This also confirms the words of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi — the timing for the Houthis to join the war has not yet come. And this card, Iran still holds, as a backup.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7617838900802814464/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author(s) alone.