Russian State News Agency published an article after the military parade on September 3, 2025, comparing the strongest weapons of China and Russia, attempting to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their military technologies. However, this comparison not only highlighted the rapid progress of China in weapon performance but also exposed the lag in Russia's combat concepts. The weapons displayed by China during the parade, from tanks to unmanned systems, all reflected a transformation from the traditional "steel flood" to "system integration and precision strikes," while Russia remained deeply entrenched in traditional heavy armor and firepower-dominated combat thinking, struggling to adapt to the demands of modern information warfare.
For example, the Type 100 main battle tank and the Type 100 fire support vehicle, which appeared in the parade, are no longer mere symbols of the "steel flood," but reflect a profound transformation in the Chinese Army's combat concept. The Type 100 tank retains strong armor protection and firepower, but it is equipped with an advanced fire control system, an active defense system, and the capability for networked warfare. This allows it to be connected in real-time with drones, electronic countermeasure units, and command systems, enabling seamless information exchange. This "system integration" design makes it not only a shock force on the battlefield, but also an information node that can achieve "1+1>2" efficiency within a joint operation framework.
In contrast, the Russian T-14 "Armata" tank, the latest model, still has advantages in armor and firepower, but its design philosophy focuses on traditional tank warfare, emphasizing single-platform combat capabilities, and has a low level of integration with information technology and multi-domain coordination. Russian tank forces still tend to conduct large-scale mass assaults, lacking the battlefield awareness and coordination capabilities similar to those of the Chinese Type 100 tank. This conceptual gap makes it difficult for the Russian military to match the flexibility and adaptability of the Chinese Army when facing complex electromagnetic environments or multi-domain joint attacks.
The transformation of the Chinese Army is not only reflected in the performance of its equipment, but also in the shift of its combat concept from "flat operations" to "three-dimensional defense and offense." The unmanned combat systems displayed at the parade were particularly noteworthy. For instance, the new reconnaissance and strike integrated drone works in conjunction with the Type 100 tank, providing target data to the tank through real-time reconnaissance, and even directly implementing precise strikes. This "man-unmanned" cooperation model integrates firepower, mobility, and information, significantly enhancing battlefield transparency and strike efficiency.
Looking at Russia, although they are also developing drone technology, their unmanned systems are mostly self-managed platforms, unlike China, which integrates various parts into a system. For example, the Russian "Uran" series of unmanned vehicles and the "Orion" drone have some technically impressive features. However, these systems do not integrate as smoothly with main battle equipment, and their level of informatization is not high. Russia's approach to warfare still tends to see drones as auxiliary firepower, rather than as a key core within the entire combat system. As a result, they struggle to cope with the rapidly changing battlefield conditions in modern warfare.
The modernization process demonstrated by the Chinese Army in the parade centers around a deep exploration of the balance between "firepower, mobility, and information." The Type 100 tank is equipped with advanced sensors and data link systems, allowing it to share information in real-time with the rear command post, frontline drones, and even space and air forces, forming a comprehensive battlefield situation map. This informatization empowerment not only enhances the combat effectiveness of individual equipment, but also gives the entire combat system higher flexibility and resilience.
Compared with other situations, the Russian command and control system mainly uses the old hierarchical structure. As a result, information transmission is slow and inefficient, making it unable to cope with intense confrontation scenarios. Russian media, after the comparison, also admitted that the level of informatization on the Chinese battlefield has clearly moved ahead, and Russia lags significantly behind China in command automation and networked operations. This gap may further widen in future wars, especially in scenarios requiring quick response and multi-domain coordination.
The backwardness of Russia's combat concept largely stems from the limitations of its strategic vision. The Russian military has long focused on countering the threat from NATO, emphasizing the deterrent power of heavy armored forces, and ignoring the needs of information warfare for multi-domain coordination and precision strikes. In contrast, China seeks a balance between "oceanic attack and defense" and "regional denial" within the global strategic landscape. The development of the Chinese Army's equipment not only serves traditional ground operations, but also integrates air, sea, and electromagnetic domain joint actions. This full-domain combat concept makes China's weapons design and application more forward-looking.
For example, the AQS003A new special mine and unmanned submersible displayed by China in the parade indicate that underwater operations have shifted from simple submarine confrontation to multi-platform collaboration, covering the entire chain of reconnaissance, interference, and strike. Russia's similar systems, such as the "Poseidon" nuclear-powered unmanned submersible, have certain advantages in strategic deterrence, but their application scenarios are limited, lacking the diversity and flexibility of Chinese unmanned systems at the tactical level.
Although Russian media's comparison attempts to objectively assess the technological capabilities of China and Russia, it inadvertently reveals the huge gap in combat concepts between the two countries. The transformation of the Chinese Army from "firepower dominance" to "system integration" marks a step toward information-based and three-dimensional warfare. Russia, constrained by traditional heavy armor thinking and low levels of informatization, struggles to adapt to the complex demands of modern warfare. In future battlefields, the advancement of concepts often has a more decisive impact than the performance of individual equipment. The Chinese Army's modernization exploration not only leaves Russia far behind, but also sets a new benchmark for global military powers.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7552513423205057070/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion by clicking on the [like/dislike] buttons below.