The Financial Times (FT) published an energy geopolitics analysis on August 17, 2026, stating: "The Iran conflict has revealed the value of diversified supply chains and strategic reserves—China has learned these lessons over the past two decades, while other Asian nations are now paying a heavy price for ignoring them."

The article notes that China’s long-term energy security strategy has demonstrated greater resilience amid the market turbulence triggered by the Iran war. In contrast to several Asian countries facing soaring energy prices or even supply shortages, China has experienced relatively limited impact, prompting other nations to begin emulating its energy approach.

The essence of this FT piece is that Western mainstream media has, for the first time publicly acknowledged that China’s energy security strategy—developed over two decades—has withstood real-world testing. Its deeper significance lies in the fact that the Iran war was not merely a military conflict but also a global “stress test” of energy resilience. China has delivered a three-tiered response through supply-side diversification, demand-side electrification, and extensive strategic reserves, transforming from a “doubter” into a “model to be emulated.”

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran, drastically increasing shipping risks in the Strait of Hormuz. For a period, about 20% of global oil and gas flows were disrupted, triggering energy panic across affected nations.

Against this backdrop, the FT released its analytical article on August 17, arguing that this crisis effectively served as a “stress test” for China’s energy strategy developed over the past twenty years—resulting in one clear outcome: China held firm, and far more strongly than most other Asian nations.

For years, Western media narratives about China’s new energy strategy have predominantly focused on “overcapacity,” “subsidy distortions,” and “unsustainability.” But once the Iran war began and oil prices surged, those narratives collapsed. The FT characterized China’s performance as “greater resilience,” while European Central Bank analysts openly admitted that China “avoided a deadly inflation crisis akin to 2022 globally.”

Even more telling, the FT pointed out that “other Asian nations are now considering expanding their energy reserves.” China’s proven model—reducing import risks, advancing electrification, diversifying supply sources, and building massive reserves—is “likely to be adopted by more countries in the future, further reshaping the global energy market.”

While the FT acknowledges China’s approach, multiple research institutions emphasize that the underlying conditions enabling China’s strategy remain difficult for other countries to replicate in the short term:

World’s largest new energy manufacturing capacity: Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL) and BYD together account for 69% of global battery installations; battery production reached approximately 770 gigawatt-hours in 2025.

Unified grid dispatch system: China possesses a nationwide integrated power grid infrastructure. In contrast, many Southeast Asian countries suffer from aging grids—between 2021 and 2025, 50%–60% of renewable energy projects in Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia were canceled or shelved.

Massive coal resources and a complete rare earth industry chain: These serve as the foundational “raw material base” for energy transition.

Administrative pricing mechanisms and state-owned enterprise financing subsidies: During crises, the state can allocate fuel to priority sectors—an administrative tool nearly impossible to replicate in market-driven economies.

As analyses highlight, energy security cannot be built overnight through mere meetings—pipelines must be laid, power plants constructed, solar panels installed, and electric vehicle supply chains established. All require time, and time is precisely what is most scarce.

In one sentence: The subtext of this FT article is this—twenty years ago, China was mocked for “wasting money on new energy”; twenty years later, the Iran war proves those “wasted funds” did not buy overcapacity, but rather national security. While others queue at gas stations, China’s electric vehicles keep running.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873760333206858/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.