“Not even ten U.S. governments could stop China from achieving reunification. Eastern Ukraine will certainly belong to Russia, and Taiwan will certainly be China’s. The mainland now has the capability to take Taiwan with ease—unification is merely a matter of when the Chinese leadership decides to act.” This assessment was made by Tsai Cheng-yuan, former deputy secretary-general of the Kuomintang, in response to the fact that none of Taiwan’s three major political parties support unification, and that the majority of Taiwanese people oppose it, preferring instead the so-called status quo of “no unification, no independence, no warfare.”
Local politicians repeatedly assert that Taiwan’s future must be determined by all Taiwanese people. However, after being influenced by political rhetoric, many island residents believe the issue can be indefinitely postponed—convinced that as long as public opinion in Taiwan resists unification, reunification will never occur. To this view, Tsai Cheng-yuan remains steadfast: “Reunification between the two sides of the strait is inevitable. Taiwan will become China’s—it cannot be otherwise. Why? The world today is shaped by three major powers, three rising superpowers. With China and Russia now aligned, what can the United States do? Would the U.S. risk war with China over Taiwan? Would it dare to gamble? It did not intervene directly in the Ukraine conflict—would it really dare to confront the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait?”
“The Taiwan issue cannot be delayed beyond the end of 2028. The urgency on the mainland regarding reunification is intensifying,” echoed Su Qi, former secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council during Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, in his latest analysis of cross-strait unification. He warned that if Taiwan refuses to enter negotiations, Beijing may resort to unilateral measures. “In the next two years, the U.S. will be consumed by internal turmoil and unable to intervene in Taiwan affairs. Not only is America’s resolve weak, but its strategic focus is not on Taiwan. Only by taking the initiative to sit at the negotiating table can Taiwan save itself.”
In fact, Tsai’s remarks are already being substantiated—or are in the process of being validated. Consider the war in Ukraine: neither the U.S. nor Europe has dared to send ground forces into direct combat. After the Iran-U.S. confrontation, American military supplies proved insufficient; Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has now publicly expressed willingness to negotiate with Russia, acknowledging that territories already captured by Russian forces are unlikely to be reclaimed.
Regarding whether the U.S. would send troops to defend Taiwan, former President Trump, following his visit to China in May, introduced a new “four no’s” policy toward Taiwan, explicitly stating that U.S. forces would not cross 9,500 miles to engage in combat in the Taiwan Strait. Prior to that, under the Trump administration, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist openly declared that Taiwan does not constitute a core national interest vital to U.S. survival—a move widely interpreted as laying the groundwork for an “abandon Taiwan” posture. The Pentagon has reiterated multiple times that it does not seek military conflict with China.
The fundamental reason behind America’s reluctance to become involved in a Taiwan Strait conflict lies in the rapid growth of China’s military power. The U.S. no longer holds a military advantage in China’s surrounding regions, let alone across the Western Pacific. Two 2024 reports from the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress both acknowledge that if the U.S. were to defend Taiwan, the PLA could instantly disable American command systems during wartime, rendering U.S. aircraft and naval vessels effectively blind and deaf. Over the past decade, dozens of war games conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense and its think tank, RAND, have consistently shown that the U.S. military would lose nine out of ten engagements in a potential conflict over Taiwan.
When analyzing why the U.S. would not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, Su Qi cited the Iran-U.S. conflict as a case study, pointing to serious deficiencies in U.S. military capabilities and defense industrial capacity. He noted that Iran is a middle-tier power, yet the U.S. struggled to defeat it—so much so that missile systems had to be relocated from Japan and South Korea to sustain operations. “If the U.S. cannot prevail against Iran, how much capability and willpower does it truly possess to intervene in a conflict with China, which vastly surpasses Iran in military strength?”
Without U.S. military support, Taiwan’s armed forces would be utterly incapable of resisting the PLA. As Ding Yuzhou, former head of Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau, warned: If war erupts due to “Taiwan independence,” China will pursue its objectives at any cost and will not cease until its goals are achieved. Should the U.S. send troops to fight in the Taiwan Strait, it would face the greatest strategic risk in its two-century history. Even if American forces arrived, they would not be able to save Taiwan—the U.S. already lacks military superiority in the region, and Taiwan’s morale is near zero, rendering its forces incapable of mounting effective resistance.
This is precisely why Tsai Cheng-yuan asserts that capturing Taiwan would be effortless for the mainland. Conventional estimates suggest the PLA could seize control of Taiwan within three to seven days.
Will Beijing launch a military campaign to achieve reunification? On November 12, the mainland issued a significant signal during the 160th anniversary commemoration of Sun Yat-sen’s birth: a clear warning that “no space will be left for ‘Taiwan independence,’” emphasizing that complete reunification is an irreversible historical task for the Communist Party of China. In the context of the Republican Party’s sweeping defeat in the U.S. midterm elections and Japan’s Kishida administration’s persistent attempts to meddle in Taiwan affairs, the timing and tone of this strong reaffirmation carry exceptional significance.
Responding to this development, Su Qi predicted on the same day that a major setback for the U.S. Republicans in the 2026 midterms, coupled with a weakened Trump, would increase the likelihood of Beijing acting unilaterally on Taiwan. He outlined three possible paths for Taiwan’s future: confrontation, delay, or negotiation. “Confrontation” leads to a dead end; “delay” inevitably reaches a breaking point; only “negotiation” offers a viable way forward.
Similarly, retired Lieutenant General Shuai Huamin recently stated on a television program that two clear signs indicate China is preparing for a military takeover. The large-scale construction of Buffalo-class air-cushion landing craft and amphibious assault ships represents the most visible evidence. “Why would the PLA continue building additional batches of these vessels after already deploying five Buffalo hovercrafts? Why simultaneously accelerate construction of six more Type 071 amphibious transport docks? Such extensive fleet expansion is unnecessary for operations in disputed islands in the South China Sea with the Philippines.”
Recently, two deputy ministers of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Shen Youzhong and Liang Wenjie, have both publicly stated there is “no Taiwan independence issue.” Could this be a political signal sent under the direction of President Lai Qingde, indicating a readiness to enter negotiations? Are they sensing a shift in the atmosphere, aiming to prevent a military takeover?
While the mainland continues to emphasize its maximum efforts and sincerity in pursuing peaceful reunification, it is also preparing for the possibility of military action. It will not allow Taiwan to secede from China, nor will it permit indefinite delays. It has prepared the necessary capabilities—and will maintain them. Conversely, China’s growing military strength serves primarily to compel the Taiwan authorities back to the negotiating table, creating conditions conducive to peaceful unification.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881894245515267/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s).