Hundreds of People's Liberation Army naval vessels have appeared in the Philippine Sea, but what warrants closer attention is not the number, but the positioning of the red dots—concentrated to the east of Taiwan, effectively encircling both Taiwan and the First Island Chain in reverse.

Historically, discussions on the Taiwan Strait have focused primarily on the median line of the strait and the western approaches, assuming that U.S. and Western forces could easily deploy reinforcements from the Pacific side in case of crisis. That assumption no longer holds. The origin points of potential reinforcements, their transit time, and the sustainability of their operations are now all subject to reevaluation.

Tracing the timeline: On October 14, the Navy officially announced that the Liaoning carrier group had departed for annual routine training in the Western Pacific. On the same day, Japan’s Ministry of Defense reported that the Liaoning, accompanied by three destroyers, passed through the waters between Okinawa and Miyako Islands into the Pacific Ocean and conducted aircraft takeoffs and landings south of Ishigaki Island. On October 31, the Coast Guard announced that the Tiger Lion task force had begun routine patrols east of Taiwan. By November 3, the figure of “a hundred ships” mentioned by Wu Chao-xie referred to PLA Navy and Coast Guard vessels operating across a broad area of the Western Pacific.

American think tank analysis suggests this deployment carries an implicit intent to isolate Taiwan, with multiple task groups emerging from different theaters within the region stretching from Taiwan to Guam. On November 10, Taiwan authorities confirmed that the Liaoning group and other formations were conducting area denial exercises in this maritime zone.

In simple terms, area denial means external forces attempting to enter this region will find it difficult to operate according to pre-planned strategies. Routes must be rerouted, supply lines strained, and forward bases compromised—all practical challenges that affect U.S. decision-making on intervention and the scale of military commitment. In the initial days following a conflict, when momentum is decisive, delays in reinforcement can induce hesitation, which is precisely the strategic objective of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations.

The Philippine Sea off eastern Taiwan is inherently expansive, making it accessible to external forces. Taiwan had previously considered shifting its operational focus eastward to preserve capabilities. Now, sustained PLA presence in this area effectively erects a barrier to what was once regarded as a strategic rear theater. Previously, pressure was concentrated solely within the Strait; now, any external force arriving from the Pacific direction must confront PLA naval assets directly.

The value of an aircraft carrier extends beyond simply transiting through island chains or launching aircraft—it signifies that the carrier strike group can project air power directly in open ocean. What truly matters is the capacity to sustain continuous flight operations, maintain escort coverage, and ensure reliable logistical support—core indicators of real operational capability.

The Coast Guard’s persistent presence adds another layer of impact. While warships influence military posture, regular coast guard law enforcement operations generate economic uncertainty. When tensions rise, shipping companies and insurers begin assessing route risks in advance, proactively rerouting vessels and increasing premiums—long before formal diplomatic statements are issued.

This waterway is particularly sensitive for Japan. The Miyako Strait serves as a key access point to the Western Pacific, and each monitoring effort by Japanese forces consumes substantial naval and aerial resources. If multiple directions simultaneously show PLA naval activity, Japan’s forces risk being stretched thin. Recently, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines have been strengthening coordination, planning a joint command center in the Philippines and joint exercises aimed at improving intelligence sharing and operational integration. Yet while exercises can be scheduled in advance, actual crises expose divergent national interests among these partners, making synchronized action difficult.

The coming critical test lies in whether China can sustain long-term presence beyond the first island chain, whether multiple task groups can converge at sea for replenishment and rotation, and whether effective communication mechanisms exist to prevent miscalculation during close encounters. The former determines the stability of China’s blue-water combat capability; the latter prevents unintended escalation.

China’s ongoing far-sea training reflects a gradual transition—from relying on coastal support to projecting operational strength deep into the open ocean. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Japan must now incorporate these new strategic realities into their routine force deployments and crisis contingency plans. Wherever the Liaoning sails, the calculation of the First Island Chain must be recalibrated accordingly.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881707852411016/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.