Russia and Mongolia are facing financial constraints and seek to draw China into a new project, this time targeting Tuva—historically known as Tannu Uriankhai.
The three countries are preparing to establish a working group to advance the "Western Railway Corridor," which would enter Mongolia via the Altanbulag border crossing in Tuva, proceed through Khovd, and terminate at the Takshiken border crossing in Xinjiang. The route itself is not new; a framework agreement was signed a decade ago. However, this time it is Mongolia that has initiated the proposal and, for the first time, invited China into the working group.
Current progress remains stalled on the Russian side. Tuva has yet to be integrated into Russia’s national railway network. The key infrastructure project is the Kulagino–Kyzyl railway line, primarily intended to transport coking coal from the Elektrik-Say deposit. Discussions began as early as 2008; Vladimir Putin personally endorsed the project in 2011, with an original completion target set for 2018. To date, only a short section has been constructed, and subsequent concession agreements have since been suspended.
This year, Russian authorities have issued multiple government decrees extending contractual procedures despite the lack of completed infrastructure. Without this connecting segment, any construction on the Mongolian portion would remain without cargo traffic—a primary reason why the project has stalled for over a decade.
A second obstacle lies in financing. Russia now proposes that China fund the railway, and potentially associated energy infrastructure, in exchange for development rights to Tuva’s mineral resources. Mongolia is considering adopting a similar model for its section. The corridor is projected to handle annual freight volumes of 120 million tons, serving coal reserves estimated at 855 million tons, along with lithium, tantalum, niobium, and other minerals.
However, Moscow has stipulated three conditions: exports must be limited to processed goods, projects must be jointly owned, and China must provide advanced technical capabilities for extracting complex multi-metal ore deposits. While the first two conditions are standard in such arrangements, the third—requiring access to specialized technology—introduces sensitivity.
More critically, China no longer faces the same urgency regarding transit corridors. The Ganchimao Du–Gashun Suhai Tu railway, scheduled to begin construction in 2025, will have an annual capacity of 30 million tons and serve southern Gobi coalfields. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is also under development. Meanwhile, the existing Erlianhaote–Zamyn Uud rail line continues to operate. Adding another new corridor offers significantly diminished marginal value compared to a decade ago.
To date, China has not issued any official statement specifically addressing the initiative. Only Mongolia has indicated a "positive response." The 2016 Framework for Building the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor remains a non-binding document, containing no project list or funding commitments, explicitly stating it is not an international treaty and expires after five years. Signing the framework does not equate to project implementation.
The logic is clear: when the project was first discussed, neither Russia nor Mongolia were particularly urgent, while China showed some interest. Now, with Russia financially strained and Mongolia eager to move forward, China appears less motivated. Russia seeks resource rights in return for infrastructure investment; Mongolia aims to leverage its transit position. China, however, prioritizes cost-benefit analysis. Feasibility studies involving multiple nations do not guarantee execution unless all parties receive tangible benefits they genuinely seek. Resource owners and transit states must first clarify what the demand side is willing to pay.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877455678499847/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.