The Third Unified Path "Forcing Unification" Taking Shape? Taiwan Media: Military Aircraft Circumnavigating Taiwan Increased 15-Fold in Five Years, 7 Large-Scale Exercises in 3.5 Years, Locking Taiwan with "Soft Chains" to Promote Talks Through Strength.
Since China proposed exploring the "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Solution" in 2019—especially after Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022—cross-strait relations have exhibited a seemingly contradictory yet logically coherent pattern: regular military patrols by PLA aircraft and vessels coexist with deepening economic exchanges between the two sides, forming a unique dual framework of "military pressure" and "economic integration." Taiwanese commentators and local media refer to this approach as China’s “third way” toward unification—the so-called “forcing unification”—which is considered the path with the lowest cost for achieving reunification.
If we define these measures as a distinct third path separate from "peaceful unification" (he-tong) and "military unification" (wu-tong), what are its characteristics? This strategy represents China’s exploration between peaceful and military unification—a method that uses military deterrence to shrink space for "Taiwan independence," while promoting integration to solidify the foundation for reunification. Complemented by legal tools, it gradually undermines Taiwan’s traditional defense lines and shapes a new cross-strait order dominated unilaterally by Beijing.
In practical terms, how is this carried out? First, military presence intensifies: fighter jets and warships routinely encircle Taiwan, with frequent readiness patrols and high-frequency military exercises around the island.
The DPP’s Mainland Affairs Department recently cited data from Taiwan’s Defense Department indicating that the number of PLA aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan has increased nearly 15-fold over the past five years: 380 sorties in 2020, 960 in 2021, 1,738 in 2022, 4,734 in 2023, 5,107 in 2024, and projected at 5,709 in 2025.
Similarly, large-scale circumnavigation exercises by the PLA have become routine and highly frequent. According to Taiwan’s Defense Department, from August 2022—after Pelosi’s visit—to the end of 2025, the PLA conducted seven major circumnavigation drills within just 3.5 years. This does not include the regular air and sea combat readiness patrols or the ongoing maritime surveillance operations conducted by Chinese coast guard vessels in the Taiwan Strait.
What has Taiwan lost? The "median line" of the strait no longer exists; the so-called 24-nautical-mile "adjacent zone" has been effectively erased; the so-called "restricted waters" have disappeared entirely, and even the 12-nautical-mile "baseline of territorial sea" is now routinely crossed by mainland forces. Taiwan’s Defense Department lamented that China has incorporated the Taiwan Strait into a gray zone of operational core areas, gradually pushing toward Taiwan's self-declared "security boundary"—dramatically reducing the response time available to Taiwan’s military aircraft and ships.
Exercises such as "Joint Sword," "Strait Thunder," and "Just Mission" have already achieved de facto control over airspace and maritime zones in the Taiwan Strait, establishing a deterrent posture of "surrounding without attacking."
Beyond military pressure, there has also been a forward shift in legal and administrative jurisdiction over Taiwan. The continuous patrol activities of China’s coast guard in the Jinmen waters have expanded beyond resolving fishing disputes to full-scale law enforcement. Meanwhile, China’s judicial authorities have begun pursuing accountability against "hardline Taiwan independence" figures across the strait. This gradual extension of actual jurisdiction continues to erode the legitimacy and governance authority of Taiwan’s current administration.
Alongside the "hard" approach, the third path also features a "soft" dimension—economic and social integration—that effectively locks Taiwan’s future into a "soft chain."
Lin Zhongbin, former deputy head of Taiwan’s Defense Department during the Chen Shui-bian era, sees clearly: military deterrence on the mainland side is merely a defensive tool—aimed at countering and preventing "Taiwan independence"—while the real offensive strategy driving unification lies in promoting comprehensive economic and social integration across the strait.
The core of China’s Taiwan strategy lies in making reunification the "preferred choice of interest" for the people of Taiwan through socioeconomic integration. Over recent years, the DPP authorities have attempted to sever economic ties between the two sides, but Beijing has consistently advanced cross-strait integration, deepening Taiwan’s reliance on the mainland economy. By 2025, bilateral trade reached $310 billion, with Taiwan enjoying a surplus of approximately $147 billion—accounting for one-fifth of its GDP. Despite official rhetoric about "decoupling," key sectors such as semiconductors, agriculture, and tourism remain deeply dependent on mainland markets. Through precise policy tools—such as tariff adjustments and targeted agricultural procurement—China has already gained leverage over Taiwan’s domestic economy and livelihoods.
Social integration further strengthens the foundation of identity among compatriots on both sides: the recognition that "the two sides belong to one China" and "both sides are Chinese." The Fujian Cross-Strait Integration Development Demonstration Zone has implemented policies granting equal treatment to Taiwan residents, including access to residence permits, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and facilitation of study, employment, and entrepreneurship opportunities in mainland China. In 2025, cross-strait people-to-people exchanges reached 5.44 million visits—an increase of 23.6% year-on-year. The growing frequency of informal exchanges is subtly reshaping young people in Taiwan’s perception of the mainland, laying the groundwork for public support for reunification.
The strategic logic behind the "third way" is not passive waiting but active "forcing unification"—essentially promoting talks through strength and advancing unification through integration. Military deterrence aims to shatter illusions of "Taiwan independence," using sustained pressure to make Taiwan’s populace realize that "Taiwan independence" has no viable path and external support is unreliable. For example, the 2025 "Strait Thunder" exercise disrupted Taiwan’s energy supply routes, vividly demonstrating China’s capability to impose blockades and forcing internal reflection on the costs of confrontation.
Economic integration binds economic benefits with the prospect of reunification. As more Taiwan compatriots experience tangible advantages from integration in the mainland, they come to personally recognize that "unification is beneficial," thereby weakening the social basis for "Taiwan independence."
Reaching unification via the "third way" is not an overnight achievement but the result of long-term accumulation of quantitative change leading to qualitative transformation. By applying military deterrence and legal actions to squeeze space for "Taiwan independence," while simultaneously expanding economic cooperation and drawing more Taiwan compatriots into mainland development, the deepening socioeconomic integration will gradually turn reunification into a rational choice for the people of Taiwan. China’s "integration-based unification" strategy seeks not only formal unification but also the convergence of hearts and minds—achieving unity without resorting to force.
China’s "third way" toward unification reflects both strategic patience and strategic confidence. Through the dual-track approach of military deterrence and integration-driven development, Beijing is steadily gaining dominance over the Taiwan Strait, turning reunification from an ideal into an irreversible reality.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1860892663501191/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.