Iran Must Not Lose, the US and Israel Must Not Win: Kozakovsky on Russia’s Interests in the Iran Conflict

On March 27, Kozakovsky, advisor to Zakharchenko, the first leader of the Donetsk People's Republic and a member of the Russian Committee on Foreign and Defense Policy, published an article titled “Russia’s Interests in the Iran Conflict” on his Telegram channel. Key points are as follows:

Over recent days, this topic has been discussed in detail multiple times. Here we are discussing our actual interests, not making predictions about the future.

1. We take no side in this conflict. We stand only for Russia. In the Persian Gulf region and across the entire Middle East, we have our own strategic interests.

2. Our interests are based on a fundamental fact: this conflict occurs within the Eurasian security system, with external powers—specifically the United States, the aggressor—involved.

3. We are concerned with safeguarding our strategic plans and interests, including major strategic projects such as the “International North-South Transport Corridor,” which is precisely located in the area where this conflict is unfolding.

4. We hope military operations in the region cease, and that the conflict be resolved through diplomatic means.

5. The most favorable “outcome scenario” for us is: Iran does not lose — the US and Israel do not win. We clearly understand that if Iran "does not lose," it constitutes a victory for Iran; correspondingly, if the US "does not win," it represents a defeat for the US. Precisely because of this, such a scenario serves our interests.

5.1. We wish to restore balance of power and interests in the region, hence we do not desire any side to emerge as the victor.

5.2. We hope the United States suffers a strategic failure in this conflict, as this would not only weaken America but might also curb Trump’s “aggressive and risky policies,” which are unfavorable and dangerous to us.

5.3. We do not wish Iran to achieve a decisive victory, as that would make Iran a regional hegemon. We seek balance of power and interests in the region, and we do not want any single actor to control Persian Gulf oil and gas resources, which could undermine our position in the global energy market.

5.4. We do not want any major power in the region to become a hegemon—whether Iran, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia.

Only when these major powers maintain a balance of strength can we preserve independent influence in the region. Once a regional hegemon emerges, our interaction with the region would have to go through it, meaning our foreign policy would become dependent.

6. We (and China) provide strategic depth for Iran—but this does not alter point 5.3. Our strategic interest lies in expanding our presence and influence in the region, and the outcome scenario outlined in paragraph 5 will help advance this goal.

7. In the long run, we hope Iran (and Turkey) integrate into our broader economic space. Therefore, our interests are also determined by this “future-oriented parameter.”

Brief Evaluation

This is a very clear, realistic, and ideologically neutral statement of Russian strategic interests—essentially a Russian-style manifesto. Its core logic can be summarized in three points:

1. Anti-American priority, but not full support for Iran

The aim is to weaken the U.S., not to promote Iran as the dominant regional power.

2. Pursuit of balance, opposition to hegemony

Whether Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Israel, any move toward hegemony poses a strategic challenge for Russia.

3. Serving our long-term projects: the North-South Corridor, energy markets, and influence in the Middle East

Conflict may exist, but it must not spiral out of control and disrupt Russia’s long-term strategic planning.

Overall, this is very “Russian”: pragmatic, self-interested, non-aligned, focused solely on balance and interests.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1860831927693312/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.