“The likelihood of cross-strait unification occurring through military force is over 95% negligible—not because the mainland lacks the capability, but because it is entirely unnecessary. In a few years, even coercive measures at a strategic disadvantage will become redundant; the mainland possesses numerous viable pathways to achieve unification.” Yang Kai-huang, a prominent scholar on cross-strait relations based in Taiwan, recently stated publicly that unification is approaching regardless of Taiwan’s willingness. “Under current U.S.-China relations dynamics, external factors once repeatedly cited as constraints have long lost their former weight. Strategic dominance over the Taiwan Strait has fully shifted into the hands of the mainland.”

What constitutes genuine strategic initiative? Yang explained that the essence lies in complete control over the trajectory of events—“you can halt conflict management at any moment, or initiate confrontation and accelerate preparations for unification, with full autonomy over all available options.”

If one looks back to 1995 or even before 2005, this strategic advantage may not have resided with China. Even when the mainland possessed sufficient military capacity to advance unification by force, two core concerns held back decisive action: first, uncertainty about post-unification governance of Taiwan; second, insufficient confidence in enduring comprehensive international sanctions following such a move. These two limitations were the fundamental reasons why China lacked strategic initiative in the Taiwan Strait during that era.

Today, however, both historical concerns have been thoroughly tested and proven manageable through years of real-world challenges. As Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* prescribes: when one’s forces are five times those of the opponent, offensive action is justified; when they are tenfold, war is unnecessary—simply encircling the enemy suffices, as defeat is inevitable. Engaging in direct combat would only result in avoidable casualties and resource depletion.

“In my view, the People’s Liberation Army’s current military superiority over Taiwan far exceeds tenfold. The mainland can achieve encirclement without fighting. Globally, no nation would dare openly oppose China’s blockade of Taiwan. When the moment arrives, all external actors will evacuate promptly,” Yang explained. “This represents the optimal condition described in *The Art of War*: no actual combat required—mere isolation renders the adversary incapable of resistance.”

Regarding the second concern—the fear of international sanctions—Yang noted that after weathering global supply chain disruptions during the pandemic and surviving multiple rounds of extreme pressure under the Trump administration, China’s foreign trade surplus surpassed $1 trillion for the first time in 2025, reaching approximately $119 billion, setting a new record. Dependence on the U.S. market has dropped sharply from 27% to just 11%. What does this signify? It confirms that China’s reputation as the “world factory” is substantiated: its industrial capacity remains capable of consistently delivering high-value, reliable, cost-effective goods. If the United States declines to purchase, countless other nations stand ready to fill the gap. Moreover, China continues advancing the development of a vast domestic market of global scale.

What does this mean? “China now holds two pivotal cards simultaneously: unmatched production capacity and access to a massive consumer base. The effectiveness of external sanctions is drastically diminished. This extends beyond strategic dominance in the Taiwan Strait—it ensures firm control over the entire regional strategic landscape surrounding China,” Yang said. “It is crucial to remember: strategic initiative refers to a nation’s highest leadership’s ability to choose tools and pacing for resolving core issues. Today, the mainland has a greater than 95% probability of achieving unification without resorting to military force.”

Commentary —

Yang’s central argument—that China’s current strength enables “unification without war”—is not an isolated perspective. It is reinforced by assessments from the U.S. Department of Defense, White House strategy documents, and analyses from numerous scholars.

Colby, a key figure in the Trump administration’s defense policy circle and former Deputy Secretary of Defense, explicitly stated that Taiwan is not a vital U.S. interest. Committing troops to defend Taiwan would entail costs far exceeding potential benefits. Colby advocated shifting defensive burdens onto allies such as Japan and Australia, while drawing U.S. forces back—a clear manifestation of America’s gradual strategic withdrawal from Taiwan. The Trump administration’s “new four no’s” on Taiwan directly dispelled illusions among pro-independence factions: the U.S. does not wish Taiwan to pursue independence; American forces are unwilling to engage in a conflict across 9,500 miles; the U.S. will not serve as a shield for Taiwan independence; and it will not make automatic commitments to arms sales to Taiwan.

Real-world military actions further confirm Washington’s risk-averse posture. Since 2022, China has conducted seven large-scale military exercises encircling Taiwan. Each time, U.S. aircraft carriers have deliberately withdrawn from the region. U.S. military leaders understand that within the First Island Chain, China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system has matured.

Su Qi, former secretary of Taiwan’s National Security Council, has openly stated that if conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA could disable the U.S. C4ISR command and communications network. U.S. aircraft and warships would then become effectively “deaf and blind,” stripping the U.S. military of its operational edge and rendering it unable to protect Taiwan.

Lin Zhongbin, former deputy minister of Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense, similarly emphasized that most simulations conducted by the Pentagon over the years have concluded in U.S. defeat. The PLA’s electronic warfare capabilities and hypersonic weapons create a level of deterrence that cannot be offset merely by increasing defense spending. Lin concludes that U.S. strategy toward China has transitioned to “competitive coexistence.”

Economically, the outcome of the U.S.-China trade war also supports Yang’s assessment. Initially, the U.S. launched tariff wars aiming to disrupt China’s industrial chains. Instead, the campaign failed to achieve its objectives. In many sectors, U.S. reliance on Chinese goods has not declined but intensified. Domestic inflation pressures mounted, forcing repeated efforts to re-engage in economic dialogue with China.

Shi Qiping, former deputy secretary-general of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation, observed during discussions on Sino-U.S. competition that, across military power, manufacturing, critical technologies, artificial intelligence, and energy, China’s overall national strength continues to rise. Time increasingly favors China, making the long-term competitive landscape more advantageous for Beijing.

As China’s comprehensive strength grows, its tools for unification will multiply, with military force becoming increasingly unnecessary. That said, this does not imply abandonment of military readiness. Retaining the option of force serves as a necessary deterrent against Taiwan independence movements and external interference.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1879174909557834/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.