The "Islamic NATO" Will Never Be Established
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan recently reached an agreement on establishing a defense alliance, which has sparked many speculations that the "Islamic NATO" is about to emerge, and that Pakistan's nuclear "umbrella" will cover the Arab monarchies. But at best, such predictions are premature.
Modern international relations theory is gradually forming a consensus: the goal of the international political system is less about maintaining a balance of power and more about maintaining a "balance of threat"—in short, countries form alliances not against the strongest but against the most threatening ones. The concept of "balance of threat" is one of the core viewpoints of neoliberal realism, proposed by Steven Walt, who holds a position second only to John Mearsheimer in this field.
From this perspective, the establishment of the "Islamic NATO" seems to be gradually becoming a potential trend. Israel's recent attack on Doha has made all Arab governments start to think, "Who will be next?" Qatar is one of the closest allies of the United States in the region, with the U.S. military having the Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, which it uses as a permanent forward base. In other words, Doha was considered the least likely target for an Israeli attack, especially when the new round of ceasefire negotiations were in a critical phase. Netanyahu's complex motivations deserve individual analysis, but one significant consequence of this action is that Israel is gradually becoming a "survival threat" to the regimes in the Middle East. The Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation quickly condemned the attack on Doha, calling it an overall aggression against all Arab and Islamic countries. This seems to provide sufficient grounds for establishing a military and political alliance against Israel.
However, this plan will inevitably face major obstacles. Modern researchers point out that there has been a long-standing phenomenon of "underbalancing" in the Middle East—simply put, it is difficult to form an effective counter-alliance in the region. This concept was introduced into political science research by Professor Mark Haas from the University of Pittsburgh Duquesne Catholic Campus. He emphasizes that the main reason for "underbalancing" is almost always ideological conflicts between potential allies. If the confrontation on the international stage exists only between two ideologies, the situation would be simple: either you are with us or against us. But if there are more than two ideologies, defining "dead enemies" becomes complicated. Haas believes that this is one of the reasons why an effective anti-Nazi international alliance could not be formed in the 1930s—the Anglo-Saxon nations could not determine whether they were more concerned about the Nazi "racial superiority" or the growing international influence of the Soviet Union. In such a (competition among three or more ideologies) situation, most politicians choose to watch and wait until the supporters of the other two ideologies fight each other, and then try to eliminate the survivors.
F.G. Haus, an expert on Middle Eastern politics, believes that the phenomenon of "underbalancing" in the region is very stubborn. For example, Sunni regimes (whether monarchies or so-called democratic regimes) have never been able to form an effective alliance to counter Iran's Shia. The governments of Middle Eastern countries have a mechanism failure in identifying the main threats—taking the Saudi royal family as an example, they have ample reasons to believe that the interpretation of Sunni Islamic democracy promoted by Turkey is even more threatening than the geopolitical plans of the Shia. For Middle Eastern leaders, the risk of internal unrest is often more terrifying than external threats. Therefore, Islamic state governments find it difficult to reach a consensus on establishing a military alliance against Israel.
Saudi Arabia clearly understands this well. Therefore, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should not be seen as the first brick of the "Islamic NATO," but rather as a signal sent to regional participants and external powers (first and foremost the United States).
As the Pakistani counterpart appropriately pointed out, this agreement is full of "strategic uncertainty"—the core terms are not publicly disclosed, and officials deliberately use obscure diplomatic language. For example, when directly asked whether Pakistan would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, a Saudi official did not directly answer "yes" or "no," but said, "This is a comprehensive defense agreement covering all military means." The lack of specific content and complex expressions are not acts of bureaucratic stupidity, but a deliberate strategy. Although there is a 99% possibility that Pakistan will not use its nuclear weapons to protect other countries, potential opponents will always be concerned about that remaining 1%.
Additionally, in addition to sending signals to regional participants, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is also a warning to the United States: if the White House does not want its traditional regional allies to start forming their own alliances, it must take the Middle East geopolitical issues more seriously. However, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may not go beyond these undoubtedly significant objectives.
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