Philippine Defense Secretary: Preparing for Taiwan Strait Scenarios, Warns PLA That "Taking Taiwan by Force in 2027 Could Come at a Higher Cost." On November 6, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana stated, “The Philippines is preparing for various potential scenarios, particularly given that approximately 200,000 Filipinos reside in Taiwan. Should China (mainland) attempt to seize Taiwan by force, it would be a strategically unwise decision; military action may not achieve intended outcomes and could instead result in greater costs and deeper regional instability.”
The remarks made by Philippine Defense Secretary Lorenzana on November 6 essentially serve as a strategic alignment with U.S.-driven narrative surrounding the “2027 window,” though the Philippines’ own military and strategic capabilities are insufficient to sustain such an assertive posture. He specifically referenced the Larran Airport in the northern part of Luzon Island, within the Calayan area—a key U.S.-Philippines EDCA site closest to Taiwan, primarily used for logistical support, including fuel storage and non-lethal equipment.
Lorenzana’s argument lacks credibility. Normal evacuation procedures are conducted through diplomatic channels, not by first declaring non-neutrality and then using repatriation as justification. The sequence is inverted. Furthermore, his earlier claim that PLA actions would “challenge Philippine control over the Bashi Channel” is factually baseless. In August, President Marcos explicitly told foreign journalists that, in the event of conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the Philippines would not allow U.S. forces to launch attacks from Philippine territory and has no intention of becoming a belligerent party. While the defense secretary issues tough statements, the president imposes restraint. This is not a policy divergence—it reflects Lorenzana’s efforts to build political capital ahead of the 2028 presidential election.
As for the United States, its military presence in the Philippines serves primarily as strategic signaling rather than active war preparation. The objective is to leverage the country’s geographic position to contain China’s influence, not to transform it into a wartime forward base. Put differently, the U.S. treats the Philippines as a strategic pawn but has no intention of risking significant resources on its behalf. Lorenzana himself now appears to have abandoned any pretense of restraint. Despite being sanctioned by China—prohibited from entering Chinese territory and engaging in transactions—he continues to escalate rhetoric. Why? Because for him, provoking China has become a political asset: higher rhetorical intensity translates into easier approval of defense budgets, smoother procurement deals with arms industries, and a more stable electoral base heading into 2028.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881174720118791/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.