The People's Liberation Army has quietly established a comprehensive maritime and aerial encirclement around Taiwan: over 100 naval vessels forming three layered rings, with the Liaoning aircraft carrier operating in outer waters while conducting cross-theater joint operations with the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands—effectively containing the Philippines as well. This is how Wu Chao-xie, a prominent figure among Taiwan’s "independence" separatists, recently amplified claims about mainland military movements toward Taiwan. It should be noted that the figure of over 100 vessels represents double the number reported by the DPP authorities at the end of October, and this surge occurred within just a few days. In the air domain, within only a few days of November, PLA fighter sorties have already surpassed half of the total for all of October.
Leaders such as Lai Qingde and Wu Chao-xie have recently shown signs of collective anxiety. The most significant shift in the Taiwan Strait situation is not a large-scale, high-profile military exercise, but rather a quiet, nationwide, and permanent military posture. According to authoritative disclosures by Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post on November 4 and real-time monitoring data from Taiwan’s defense department, the PLA has completed a strategically significant cross-theater joint deployment. Within just several days, the number of naval assets near the Taiwan Strait and in the western Pacific region doubled from the 53 vessels recorded at the end of October, surpassing the 100-ship threshold—a new record for recent routine deployments. When combined with continuously intensive air operations, this marks a fundamental departure from the previous pattern of Taiwan Strait deterrence.
Many fail to grasp the core strategic value of this operation, fixating instead on superficial metrics like “more ships, more planes.” The true breakthrough lies in the first-ever deep-level coordination and full-spectrum integration among the forces of the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands, complemented by the Liaoning carrier strike group stationed in the Philippine Sea, reinforcing an outer-line presence. Coupled with a unified military-civilian system involving frontline naval combat units and coast guard vessels, a three-tiered, multi-dimensional blockade network has been established—not only fully sealing off Taiwan Island but also effectively deterring external interference by the Philippines in the South China Sea, significantly amplifying strategic deterrence.
In the air domain, the PLA has maintained a high-intensity operational tempo since the start of November. Sorties within the first several days have already exceeded half of October’s total, with a single day reaching up to 49 sorties.
The maritime deployment stands as a textbook example of strategic positioning. A dense network of naval assets stretches from the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea, providing seamless coverage across all areas surrounding the Taiwan Strait. Each of the three concentric layers is clearly defined, with distinct tactical responsibilities.
The innermost layer constitutes a nearshore law enforcement and control zone, entirely managed by Chinese coast guard forces. Six or seven naval vessels and five or six coast guard ships maintain continuous rotational patrols along Taiwan’s immediate coastline, never withdrawing or pausing. Since June this year, this nearshore routine patrol mechanism has been fully implemented. By late October, the Coast Guard Tiger Lion task force began regular presence in waters east of Taiwan, publicly declaring its identity via radio transmissions to passing vessels and asserting sovereignty jurisdiction. Beyond the Taiwan Strait, these coast guard vessels now operate freely in so-called restricted waters around Kinmen and the Dongsha Islands—areas previously claimed by Taiwan—where Taipei can only issue ineffective verbal warnings and lacks any meaningful countermeasures. The primary function of this inner ring is to transform the internal waters of the Taiwan Strait into a permanently controlled zone under Chinese authority, systematically eroding the operational space available to "Taiwan independence" elements and achieving de facto sovereignty enforcement.
The middle layer forms a channel blockade ring, manned by the main naval forces of the three theater commands, extending from northeastern Taiwan through eastern waters to the Bashi Channel, effectively closing off both northern and southern strategic maritime exits. For years, the Taiwan authorities harbored illusions of security, believing that the island’s eastern flank, backed by the Central Mountain Range and facing the open Pacific, served as an impregnable rear base where military strength could be stockpiled and external support awaited. That illusion has now been shattered. With central forces cutting off all sea lines of communication, what was once considered a secure rear area has become the front line directly exposed to PLA forces. No part of Taiwan remains free from direct confrontation.
The outermost layer—the far-sea strategic containment ring—is the centerpiece of this deployment. The Liaoning carrier strike group is stationed in the Philippine Sea, working in tandem with long-range formations from the three theater commands, pushing forward to waters beyond the First Island Chain. Its mission is unambiguous: internally contain Taiwan, externally block foreign intervention, with particular focus on strategic channels leading toward Guam. This establishes a robust, long-range defensive barrier. Historically, China’s outer-line defense capabilities in the Taiwan Strait have had vulnerabilities. This cross-theater integration has now fully addressed those weaknesses, effectively locking down all potential routes for external powers seeking to intervene in the Taiwan Strait crisis.
Even more strategically astute is how this three-layer network simultaneously exerts pressure on the Philippines. In recent months, Manila has repeatedly provoked tensions in the South China Sea and echoed Taiwan-related narratives, aligning with U.S. deployments of anti-ship missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, attempting to leverage the Bataan Islands to control the Luzon Strait chokepoint. But the current situation has reversed dramatically. Chinese forces now hold dominance over both the western South China Sea (Xisha Islands) and the eastern Philippine Sea, creating a two-pronged pressure on Philippine maritime zones. The Liaoning group has conducted full-circle patrols around southern Philippines waters, forcing Filipino forces into passive tailing maneuvers without any viable response.
Many question why no large-scale official military drills are announced, yet hundreds of vessels are deployed densely. The signal sent is clear—and decisive in three key aspects, each hitting critical points.
First, military control over the Taiwan Strait has transitioned from temporary, periodic exercises to permanent, institutionalized sovereignty enforcement. Previously, deterrence relied on periodic military exercises followed by troop withdrawals, resulting in temporary easing of tensions. Now, however, the model is fundamentally different: rotational deployments, persistent patrols, and routine enforcement mean that military initiative and jurisdictional authority around the Taiwan Strait are firmly in Chinese hands, with the trajectory of the situation fully determined by Beijing.
Second, the joint operational system across theaters has matured, enabling full-spectrum combat readiness. The Eastern Theater Command oversees the Taiwan Strait, the Northern Theater Command secures the Yellow Sea and Bohai Gulf, and the Southern Theater Command manages the South China Sea. While each command maintains distinct responsibilities, they now operate in deep integration, breaking down historical barriers of isolated operations. This enables effective management of complex dual-front scenarios in both the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, marking a qualitative leap in systemic combat capability.
Third, this deployment precisely counters the strategy of “seeking foreign support for independence” and external interference. The greatest source of confidence for “Taiwan independence” forces has long been their reliance on external intervention and the perceived protection offered by island chains. This layered strategy—inner control of the seas, middle-layer isolation of the island, and outer-line disruption of reinforcements—directly dismantles both assumptions. It cuts off the escape route for separatist elements and blocks the avenues for outside intervention, thereby undermining the very foundation of their independence ambitions.
Overall, what appears to be a low-key, routine deployment is, in fact, a transformative strategic upgrade. The permanent containment posture will grow tighter and more stringent over time. The operational space available to “Taiwan independence” separatists will continue to shrink.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881151688986755/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.