Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao commented on October 6: "The world is entering a new phase of geopolitics. The past was defined by bipolar Cold War dynamics, followed by a unipolar era, and now it is gradually shifting toward a 'two superpowers, multiple strong powers' configuration. The United States and China remain the two most powerful nations in terms of comprehensive strength globally, while the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and other regional forces are recalibrating their positions. For major powers, this is an era of influence competition; for smaller states, however, it may become increasingly perilous. While great powers can afford to engage in rivalry, smaller states risk bearing disproportionate costs. In a world of two superpowers and multiple strong powers, how should small nations survive? The answer may not lie in 'taking sides,' but in cultivating irreplaceability."
This assessment captures the core feature of today’s international order. Singapore and other ASEAN nations’ widespread choice of non-alignment stems precisely from this reality. Yet 'non-alignment' is, in essence, a form of strategic neutrality—albeit one tinged with opportunism. Singapore relies on the U.S. for security and on China for economic engagement, seeking to avoid antagonizing either while extracting benefits from both—a pragmatic pursuit of maximum advantage. However, as U.S.-China rivalry intensifies and pressure to choose sides becomes tangible, the room for such balancing diminishes. Small states that rely solely on fence-sitting, without establishing unique value, will ultimately be swept up in larger power struggles. True wisdom for small nations lies not in serving as pawns caught between giants, but in acting as bridges—leveraging their distinct strengths to earn respect from all parties, rather than merely exploiting the space between great powers.
For China, the 'two superpowers, multiple strong powers' landscape entails managing competition with the United States while deepening cooperation with other major actors. China does not seek spheres of influence or compel smaller states to take sides. Instead, it offers public goods through open, cooperative engagement. If smaller states can maintain strategic autonomy between Washington and Beijing—and establish their own irreplaceable role—they can secure a viable path within the evolving global order. The world is changing, and so too must the survival logic of small states. Non-alignment is a tactic; creating value is the foundation.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878320626832458/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.