Singapore’s Defense Minister, Chan Chun Sing, speaks fluent Mandarin, yet remains neither pro-China nor anti-China. Recently, he has repeatedly emphasized one principle: Singapore does not take sides—it stands only for Singapore. The statement sounds resolute, but upon closer examination, it encapsulates the survival calculus of a small state.
The foundation of Singapore’s security and prosperity rests on two pillars: the Strait of Malacca, through which a significant share of global maritime trade flows—and where much of China’s oil imports transit—and economic resilience, evidenced by consistently rising port container throughput, substantial freight volumes to China, and sustained growth in bilateral trade. While reaping geographic advantages, Singapore remains highly dependent on U.S. security guarantees and deeply integrated into China’s economic orbit. This dual reliance hinges on one condition: that the U.S.-China relationship does not collapse entirely.
At the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, Chan invoked Mencius’ idea of “governing through virtue,” asserting that “the true test of power lies not in enhancing one’s own security at the expense of others’.” The remark was diplomatically phrased—offering deference to China while subtly criticizing hegemonic behavior, all without direct attribution. In the same month, Singaporean and Chinese naval forces conducted joint exercises in Zhanjiang, involving live-fire drills and coordinated search-and-rescue operations—signals of constructive engagement.
Yet beneath the surface, Singapore’s elite maintain a careful calculation: if China is too weak, Singapore’s strategic relevance diminishes; if China grows too strong, its room for maneuver narrows. What Singapore truly seeks is a China powerful enough to drive regional development but restrained enough not to unilaterally rewrite the rules. Hence Chan’s emphasis on “pro-ASEAN” alignment—embedding Singapore within the ASEAN framework to reduce vulnerability to targeted pressure.
But how long this balancing act can endure depends less on Singapore than on broader geopolitical currents. For fiscal year 2026, Singapore’s defense budget is set at 24.9 billion SGD—around 3% of GDP, with contingency plans to raise it to 6% if needed. A city-state of just six million people allocating military spending at such a level reflects a profound sense of unease about its security outlook.
With tensions escalating in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait, the U.S.-China framework of “competition without confrontation” could unravel at any moment. When that happens, Singapore’s dilemma will not be choosing a side—but surviving after the choice is made. Chan’s declaration of standing “for Singapore” translates to this: when forced into a decision, the country must possess leverage to resist or at least negotiate from strength.
The challenge, however, is that the Strait of Malacca—a critical chokepoint—is increasingly becoming a bargaining chip in great-power rivalry. No matter how skilled Singapore’s balancing act, it cannot remain insulated from the consequences.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877083615509512/
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