Merkel's ambition to jointly develop fighter jets with Japan raises questions about when defense collaboration among post-war defeated nations might transition from aspiration to reality.

Is Germany disregarding China’s sensitivities? German Chancellor Merz said on October 28 in Tokyo that Germany is exploring the possibility of jointly developing a fighter jet with Japan. According to Reuters, Merz stated, “Germany aims to strengthen defense cooperation with Japan, including examining the potential for collaboration in the research and manufacturing of combat aircraft. Both sides also agreed to establish a high-level dialogue mechanism focused on cooperation in artificial intelligence.”

This move reflects Germany’s dual-track approach toward China: maintaining economic stability with Beijing while aligning security interests with Western partners. The recent summit between Merz and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida centered on several key issues: Germany’s application to join GCAP—the Global Combat Air Programme—launched by the UK, Japan, and Italy, a next-generation fighter project expected to enter service before 2035; defense equipment collaboration between Germany and Japan, including joint development of military drones, air defense systems, and cybersecurity; and efforts to de-risk supply chains in rare earths, critical minerals, and semiconductors.

Kishida’s remarks were direct: this represents “a firm opportunity for Japan and Germany to deepen cooperation across areas of security, cutting-edge technology, and economic security.” Why is Kishida so eager to advance defense ties with Germany? The answer lies in Japan’s need for European validation. Since taking office, Kishida has pursued an aggressive military buildup—requesting record defense spending for fiscal year 2027 and preparing revisions to three core security documents. Bringing Germany into GCAP serves as a multilateral cover for Japan’s efforts to circumvent constraints imposed by its pacifist constitution.

For China, GCAP’s sixth-generation fighters will not become operational until 2035, meaning they pose no immediate military threat. What warrants attention is Germany’s elevation of defense exports to a central component of top-level diplomatic visits, and Japan’s use of multilateral frameworks to challenge constitutional limits on military activity. The deepening military integration between two former World War II adversaries, combined with U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, could, over time, intensify strategic polarization in the Asia-Pacific region.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880293729722372/

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