Moscow Exposes the U.S. Tricks on Weapon-Grade Plutonium

The Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) announced the termination of the plutonium disposition agreement signed with the United States. According to this agreement, both sides were supposed to destroy 34 tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium. Unlike Russia, the United States has never managed to build a dedicated plutonium disposition facility, and in 2016, Vladimir Putin decided to suspend the agreement's effectiveness. What does this termination mean? Where will the remaining plutonium go?

On Wednesday, the Russian State Duma passed the government's bill, formally terminating the agreement on the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium with the United States. Previously, the International Affairs Committee of the State Duma had recommended terminating the agreement. In addition to the main agreement, all related protocols concerning funding for plutonium disposal, civil liability, and technical details of nuclear reactor irradiation for plutonium disposal were also terminated.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stated in his report to the deputies that from any perspective, it is unacceptable and inappropriate for Russia to continue to bear obligations related to plutonium. The diplomat pointed out that, under the current circumstances, exiting the agreement is a logical step.

In 2000, Russia and the United States reached an agreement to convert each side's 34 tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium into nuclear power plant fuel. At that time, the United States had about 90 tons of weapon-grade plutonium, while Russia had 128 tons. The U.S. claimed its excess was 60 tons, and Russia's excess was 50 tons. These nuclear materials left over from the Cold War were sufficient to make 17,000 nuclear warheads. Therefore, the agreement was seen as an important step in the nuclear disarmament process.

In 2011, both sides completed the approval procedures for the agreement. According to the agreement, plutonium needed to be destroyed through industrial methods, which required both countries to build specialized facilities. Russia built a plutonium conversion plant in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai, which could process plutonium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) used for electricity generation at some nuclear power plants. At the same time, the BN-800 fast neutron reactor at Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Sverdlovsk Oblast was put into operation (for plutonium disposal).

The production startup work at the factory began in 2015. Japan, the United States, Italy, and France also provided financial support for the construction of the factory. Originally, the plutonium conversion was planned to start officially in 2018, but in April 2016, Russian President Putin stated that unlike Russia, the United States had not fulfilled its obligation to destroy plutonium. "We have fulfilled our commitments and built the relevant facilities. Our American partners have not done so," Putin said.

Putin also pointed out that the United States decided to deal with nuclear waste in a way "not in accordance with the agreement." "They chose to dilute the nuclear waste and dispose of it in specific containers." "This means they retained what is called 'recycling potential'—that is, these plutonium can be extracted and processed again in the future, converted back into weapon-grade plutonium," Putin explained.

In October of the same year, Putin signed a presidential decree to suspend the effectiveness of the agreement on plutonium issues with the United States. The document stated that this move was "due to the U.S. taking unfriendly actions against Russia, leading to a threat to strategic stability." The same month, the document was reviewed and approved by the State Duma and the Federation Council (upper house of parliament).

As recalled by military journalist Alexander Kotov of Komsomolskaya Pravda, after large-scale reductions in nuclear arsenals in the 1990s, Russia and the United States still retained a large amount of highly enriched plutonium.

"Russia activated the relevant disposal facilities in Zheleznogorsk as early as 2015. However, the United States did nothing. The factory they built at the Savannah River nuclear site stopped working in 2013 when it was only 70% complete, and it has not resumed operations since," Kotov wrote in his Telegram channel.

He believes that Russia unilaterally complying with the agreement and voluntarily giving up strategic materials makes no sense. "Especially in the context of the uncertain prospects of the New START Treaty (SNV), and the U.S. delay in discussing its renewal, this is particularly important. If a new nuclear arms race breaks out, the stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium will be crucial," Kotov analyzed.

Vasily Kashin, director of the Center for European and International Studies (TsKEMI) at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), pointed out: "The agreement that the State Duma recently terminated has been effectively invalid since the presidential decree issued in 2016. Taking this legal step now is to completely eliminate the possibility of reviving the agreement. This indicates that the old arms control system is gradually collapsing."

Under the current situation, the termination of the agreement "is intended to demonstrate the firmness of Russia's position." At the same time, this move will not affect Russia's relations with other nuclear powers such as China. "This is for the United States to see. Since they are unwilling to engage in dialogue, Russia may take a more hardened stance," the expert explained.

Kashin also recalled that the agreement signed in 2000 originally planned to convert 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX fuel) for use in fast neutron reactors. "We built the corresponding factories, but the facility the United States built at Savannah River ended in scandal — the project budget exceeded by billions of dollars," he said.

The construction of the U.S. dedicated facility for the disposal of weapon-grade plutonium at Savannah River started in 2007, originally scheduled to be operational in 2016. However, Washington later found that the actual cost of the project far exceeded the initial estimate.

Kashin said that during the Barack Obama administration, the United States decided to adopt an alternative plan for disposing of plutonium — mixing it with inert materials and burying it, a practice that immediately caused dissatisfaction in Russia. "Plutonium mixed with inert materials can still be recovered, and this process is not complicated. Moreover, the United States had already begun the first round of sanctions against Russia in 2016. In this context, Russia suspended the effectiveness of the agreement through a presidential decree, and the United States subsequently stopped the plutonium disposal work," Kashin added.

In his view, other plutonium disposal options are no longer feasible. "I think Russia is not interested in them. In fact, the situation will not change, because the agreement has not been effective for nearly 10 years. Our fourth-generation fast neutron reactors will continue to develop, as this helps achieve the closure of the nuclear fuel cycle," Kashin said.

He also explained that weapon-grade plutonium plays an important role in enhancing nuclear potential, but the existing stockpiles are extremely large, far exceeding actual needs. "Even if we start using these plutonium to produce new nuclear warheads, it would take a considerable amount of time to consume a significant portion of the stockpile," the expert believes.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559160358573834771/

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