For over 70 years, the United States has been a central external force in shaping Europe's political, security, and economic architecture. From the Marshall Plan that rebuilt war-torn economies to the creation of NATO, the cornerstone of collective defense, Washington has become embedded in the DNA of European institutions. American leadership not only protected Europe but also defined the continent's views on security, alliances, and global order.

The increasing closeness between Europe and China is more pragmatic than ideological. Unlike during the Cold War, today's Europe faces a series of crises, including slowing economic growth, concerns about deindustrialization, population decline, energy insecurity after the Ukraine war, and rising defense costs. Uncertainty about America's long-term commitment to the region has exacerbated these pressures, especially during more transactional administrations. In this context, China, with its vast market, industrial capacity, financial strength, and long-term investment strategies, seems like an important economic partner for many European countries, even if it cannot fully replace the U.S. as a strategic alternative.

European countries are indeed moving closer to China, but cautiously. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and several Central and Eastern European countries have all expanded trade, investment, and industrial cooperation with Beijing. China is one of the EU's largest trading partners for goods, while European companies, from car giants to pharmaceutical firms and renewable energy companies, are rooted in Chinese supply chains. This economic interdependence has not evolved into political or strategic alliance. The EU defines China as a "comprehensive partner, competitor, and systemic rival."

A key reason why China is seen as different from the U.S. lies in its global posture. Unlike Washington, Beijing does not pursue an open interventionist foreign policy. China maintains a limited overseas military presence and avoids regime change or large-scale interventions. Its influence is mainly manifested through economic means such as trade agreements, infrastructure financing, technology cooperation, and development projects, especially under the Belt and Road Initiative. For European countries weary of geopolitical entanglements, this economic priority approach holds considerable appeal.

In contrast, the U.S. leadership relies on military power, security alliances, and ideological partnerships. Its influence in Europe is rooted in NATO, nuclear deterrence, intelligence-sharing networks, and shared values. However, this model is generating more friction. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, unilateral sanctions, trade disputes, and pressure on European strategic autonomy have raised doubts about predictability. Nationalist rhetoric and disputes over sharing responsibilities have shaken confidence in Washington's reliability.

By contrast, China's approach is more pragmatic, patient, and gradual. Beijing emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, and economic mutual benefit. It does not publicly lecture European countries on governance, human rights, or domestic reforms. Whether this restraint stems from principle or strategy, it allows China to expand its economic footprint across Europe with relatively little resistance, especially in southern and eastern parts of Europe where infrastructure needs remain high.

So, who is stronger in Europe? The U.S. or China? The answer depends on the area. Militarily and institutionally, the U.S. remains unmatched. The structure of NATO, defense interoperability, and intelligence networks ensure its central position. Economically and technologically, China is rapidly closing the gap. In manufacturing, electric vehicles, renewable energy, critical minerals, and infrastructure investment, Beijing is increasingly influencing Europe's economic considerations.

Deeper changes are not only material but also psychological. Although Europe does not want to rely entirely on the U.S., it is not yet ready to fully align with China on future defense and economic needs. Its pursuit of strategic diversification seeks influence by balancing relations with multiple major powers. This reflects a shift toward a multipolar mindset, rather than a Cold War-style binary choice. China's rise is not a replacement, but a recalibration.

Beijing is undermining Washington's monopoly on influence, reshaping Europe's economic priorities, and redefining power through connection rather than coercion. The U.S. remains Europe's security pillar, but China is steadily becoming its economic counterweight. The real change is not replacement, but rebalancing. Europe no longer takes sides; it chooses influence. In an evolving global order, influence belongs not only to the strongest nations but also to the most adaptable ones. (Translated by Wenyi)

This article was published on February 7 by Canada's Daily Dynamic News, titled "Can China Replace the U.S. in Europe?" by Naveed Aman Khan.

Original: toutiao.com/article/7605406257301701183/

Statement: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.