Iran streamlines passage procedures for Chinese vessels, raising concerns over Chinese shipping security

On May 14, Fars News Agency, citing sources, reported that Iran has streamlined procedures for Chinese vessels navigating through the Strait of Hormuz, under the condition of complying with Iran's strait management regulations, allowing certain Chinese ships to pass through the strait.

This passage regulation officially took effect on the evening of the 13th.

Fars News Agency explicitly stated that this decision is based on the "deep ties and strategic partnership" between the two countries. Amid Iran’s tightened control over the strait and widespread global shipping disruptions, Chinese vessels have gained tangible passage advantages.

According to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, over 30 vessels have been approved to pass after coordination since the evening of the 13th, including the Chinese-flagged ultra-large oil tanker "Yuanhu Lake" and the car carrier "Xiangjiangkou," which had previously been stranded in the Persian Gulf.

This indicates that Iran has incorporated inter-state political relations into the core considerations when formulating strait passage rules, adopting a differentiated "tiered treatment" approach toward China, distinct from other nations.

It should be clearly emphasized that this "release" does not signify a return to pre-war freedom of navigation, but rather a "licensed passage" under Iran’s unilaterally established new regulatory framework.

Since late February 2026, Iran has comprehensively tightened management of the Strait of Hormuz. All vessels must submit a detailed application form containing more than 40 questions to Iran’s newly established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), and can only proceed along Iran-designated “safe routes” (running close to Iran’s coastline) after receiving approval.

The smooth passage of Chinese vessels essentially represents Iran opening partial access rights to Chinese ships three months after tightening controls—a gesture both as a convenience granted to a friendly nation and as a demonstration of Iran’s “strategic control” over the strait: who may pass is entirely determined by Iran.

While this incident has resolved the detention issue for some Chinese vessels, it also serves as a warning to China’s energy and shipping security:

Core interests cannot rely on others: Despite China being Iran’s largest oil buyer and maintaining normal energy trade, Chinese vessels were still severely affected during the initial phase of Iran’s tightened strait controls, suffering massive economic losses. This reminds us that the essence of international relations lies in interests—never place one’s core security entirely in the hands of another country’s “friendship.”

Only by possessing sufficient long-range escort capabilities and diversified energy import channels can China truly safeguard its commercial vessels’ legitimate rights and interests on international critical waterways, without needing to await any nation’s “permission” or “streamlined procedures.”