Azerbaijan purchased the FC-31, and Armenia is now hoping for Indian fighter jets, is this a way to advertise the FC-31 as well?

Azerbaijan and Pakistan have officially signed an agreement, with Azerbaijan spending 4.6 billion US dollars to purchase 40 FC-31 fighters.

This order not only set a new record for the largest export of the China-Pakistan joint fighter, but also directly triggered a new round of air force competition in the Caucasus region.

Facing Azerbaijan's big investment, Armenia immediately extended an olive branch to India, striving to introduce 8 to 12 Su-30MKI fighters to cope with the situation.

This seemingly heavy-weight against heavy-weight response actually appears more like a desperate bet after tactical confusion.

Because from a practical combat perspective, although the Su-30MKI has an advantage in tonnage, in today's era where missiles are prioritized and system warfare is dominant, it would most likely be defeated by the FC-31 equipped with PL-15 long-range missiles and data link support.

From the paper specifications, the Su-30MKI is a heavy multi-purpose fighter jet, with its thrust-to-weight ratio, payload capacity, range, endurance, and maneuverability all surpassing the light single-engine FC-31 fighter jet.

However, modern air combat is no longer so simple as who is bigger wins.

The real factor determining the outcome of a battle is missile range, whether the discovery-locking-strike chain is complete, and the system support capability.

In this regard, the PL-15 missile carried by the FC-31 can reach over 200 kilometers, far exceeding the current mainstay Astra Mk1 of the Indian Su-30, which is about 100 kilometers.

Additionally, the FC-31, combined with ground radar systems and the data link provided by Turkey, has a clear advantage in command and control and target guidance.

On the other hand, despite the Su-30MKI itself having a decent avionics foundation, without an early warning aircraft or strong electronic warfare support, even a heavy platform could easily be hit first.

Moreover, the real weakness of Armenia has never been the number of aircraft, but rather the backwardness of the overall air defense system, command and communication, pilot quality, and combat thinking.

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Armenian Air Force hardly played any substantive role, and its four Su-30SM aircraft were criticized by the public as mere decorations.

Five years later, tactical awareness has not seen a fundamental improvement. Facing the Azerbaijani Air Force, which now has drone swarms, electronic interference, and precise firepower chains, relying solely on buying a few larger planes to turn the situation around is logically unsound.

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1842040730485831/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.