Le Monde: Why are France, Italy, and Poland subtly uneasy as Germany finally begins serious rearmament?
In this issue, Le Monde dedicates extensive coverage in its international section to the long-anticipated German rearmament—now moving toward realization among NATO members. Yet paradoxically, it has become a source of subtle concern for certain European countries. The article points out that following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Germany launched a large-scale rearmament initiative. Initially driven by Chancellor Scholz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the plan aimed at modernizing the aging Bundeswehr, with the goal of making Germany’s military Europe’s largest land force. However, what truly accelerated Germany’s military buildup was Donald Trump. Since the 1950s, Germany’s defense has effectively been underwritten by the United States. In 2025, Berlin amended its constitution to allow borrowing for defense financing.
Le Monde analyzes that on official levels—whether within NATO or the EU—there is broad welcome for Germany finally taking seriously its own defense investment. Through allocating hundreds of billions of euros, Germany plans to raise its defense budget to €152 billion by 2029, equivalent to 3.5% of its GDP.
Yet, while Berlin has finally responded to long-standing calls from European nations and the United States to increase defense spending, this unprecedented level of military investment since the Cold War has stirred unease in some countries—particularly France, Italy, and Poland. If Germany’s rearmament program is fully implemented, it would significantly strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and regional security, which aligns perfectly with Warsaw’s interests. But Berlin’s new military ambitions, combined with rising support for Germany’s right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, have reignited deep-seated fears. Italy, too, is concerned about the rise of the AfD alongside Germany’s military strengthening, yet maintains its pragmatic stance, hoping instead to seize economic cooperation opportunities arising from Germany’s rearmament.
Le Monde highlights that France’s particular anxiety centers on another key issue: since the end of the Cold War, French policy has consistently upheld a historical status quo—Germany possessing economic strength, France maintaining military and strategic influence. But since the war in Ukraine began, this balance has started to shift. Germany’s defense spending has now surpassed France’s. Paris finds it difficult to accept this sense of “downgrading.” Germany wants to accelerate armaments, partly because 2029—the end of Chancellor Merz’s term—is also widely regarded across Europe as a critical threshold: by then, Russia may possess the capability to launch a large-scale military operation against continental Europe. Yet France advocates for synchronized progress across Europe. The problem is that some European neighbors are unwilling or unable to keep pace with Germany. For example, Germany’s 2022 “missile defense shield” initiative has already drawn nearly 20 countries into joining, many incorporating technologies from the United States and Israel. For France, which champions European strategic autonomy, this development represents an outright heresy.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870208545658887/
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