The outcome of Canada's submarine procurement tender has revealed that all parties are well aware of the technological capabilities of South Korean defense products.

Headlined by the Toronto Sun, the Canadian Prime Minister, Trudeau, is reportedly considering a submarine deal involving two companies. He is currently en route to Halifax to announce the decision, with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp (212CD model) ultimately emerging as the winner.

German Proposal (ThyssenKrupp): Offers the 212CD submarine (co-developed by Germany and Norway), emphasizing Arctic adaptability, NATO interoperability, and rapid delivery through capacity reallocation—four submarines to be delivered before 2035.

(Hanwha Ocean): Proposes the KSS-III class submarine, promising earlier launch timelines (2029) and large-scale technology transfer with local production facilities; however, certain core systems still rely on German licensing.

Experts analyze that the most serious issue with South Korea’s submarine technology lies in its heavy reliance on German and American supply chains for critical subsystems—such as AIP inverters and high-pressure steel—making independent maintenance or replacement impossible. Combined with strict international non-proliferation mechanisms and the Korea-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement, which severely restricts nuclear propulsion technologies, this has led to frequent breakdowns of current mainstay vessels ("stuck in port") and significant delays in next-generation projects.

Key components "choke points" and repair barriers: Among the nine KSS-II class (Son Won-class) submarines, multiple have been grounded due to cable defects in Siemens-produced inverter modules. The German side has erected intellectual property barriers, refusing on-site repairs in South Korea, forcing return to factory—resulting in individual submarine downtime exceeding six months. Although the KSS-III is marketed as independently designed, its power core still depends on German technology, carrying the same risks.

Vulnerable material supply chain: Nearly 50% of special shipbuilding steel (high-pressure and corrosion-resistant) is imported from China; interruption in supply would directly halt shipbuilding programs for several years.

Legal and technical dual blockade on nuclear power technology: The Korea-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement prohibits South Korea from obtaining nuclear fuel enriched beyond 20% (required for nuclear-powered submarines), and the U.S. has never transferred military nuclear reactor technology to any ally—leaving the "Jang Bogo-N" nuclear submarine project trapped in an insurmountable structural deadlock: no viable fuel source and rejected technology transfer.

Artificially inflated domestic content and quality control failure: Actual domestic content for KSS-I/II classes is only around 34%-39%. A scandal previously erupted when domestically produced screws failed due to insufficient strength, causing hull structural failures—exposing fundamental shortcomings in basic manufacturing processes and quality control systems failing to meet military standards.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870008295319616/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.