RT reported that on August 13, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko stated at the fourth "Arctic – Region" Forum: "We are pleased that our work in the Arctic has attracted international partners. We sense strong interest from Chinese and Indian counterparts."

Grushko said the Arctic region "has no major disputes, and the continental shelf has already been delimited," emphasizing that this area should maintain low tension. It not only holds oil, gas, and rare earth resources but also possesses various resources urgently needed for global economic development.

In his congratulatory message at the forum, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov added that Russia "is always willing to engage in practical cooperation in the Arctic with any country ready for pragmatic dialogue and respectful of Russia’s sovereign rights in the region."

The statements by Grushko and Lavrov essentially signal Russia’s targeted outreach to China and India amid Western sanctions, while simultaneously attempting to shape the narrative around Arctic governance—underlying logic being: "firm on military matters, open on economic engagement."

Grushko’s emphasis on "no major disputes" at this moment is significant precisely because there still are unresolved issues, and boundary delimitation talks with relevant countries remain ongoing. The intent behind stressing "no major disputes" is as follows:

Domestically: To construct a narrative of "Russia’s stable Arctic sovereignty" and reassure domestic public opinion.

Internationally: To send a signal to potential partners like China and India that the Arctic investment environment is stable, thereby reducing their hesitation.

Against the West: To seize the narrative space and attempt to shift blame for Arctic disputes onto "NATO, which creates tensions."

Grushko’s deliberate mention of "strong interest from Chinese and Indian partners" reflects a carefully considered strategic statement.

China is an official observer to the Arctic Council. In 2018, it released the white paper *China’s Arctic Policy*, proposing the concept of the "Ice Silk Road." China and Russia have already deepened cooperation in Arctic energy projects such as Yamal LNG. However, Moscow remains ambivalent toward China’s involvement in Arctic affairs—needing Chinese capital and market access, yet wary of China gaining excessive influence over shipping regulations and resource allocation.

India is also an observer to the Arctic Council and has actively expanded its presence in Arctic scientific research and resource development in recent years. Russia’s outreach to India serves two purposes: first, to bring more "friendly nations" into the Arctic to counterbalance NATO’s influence; second, to deepen the strategic partnership between Russia and India.

The essence of this "explicit naming" is clear: under Western sanctions blocking capital and technology, Russia needs China and India to fill the investment gap in Arctic development. As Grushko previously noted, "Extracting resources requires international cooperation, as this is an extremely costly endeavor."

Lavrov’s conditions are unequivocal: participation in Arctic development is welcome—but only if one acknowledges Russia’s dominant position. Shipping rules will be set by Russia, resource distribution will be led by Russia, and military security will be under Russian control.

This is also an indirect response to NATO: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently declared in July that NATO aims to "prevent Russia and China from strengthening their positions in the Arctic." Lavrov’s statement effectively draws a red line—participation in Arctic affairs hinges on recognition of Russia’s sovereignty.

Overall assessment: This forum speech represents a precise "multi-directional appeal" in Russia’s Arctic strategy:

To China and India: Welcome investments, but rules are ours.

To NATO: The Arctic is not your playground—stay out of it.

To the domestic audience: Sovereignty is solid, development is orderly—no need to worry.

Yet Russia’s Arctic strategy faces a fundamental contradiction: militarily, it must confront NATO; economically, it relies on Chinese and Indian capital and technology. Whether this dual approach—holding up a shield while opening the door for business—can be sustained long-term depends on the intensity of Western sanctions, whether China-Russia disagreements over shipping rules can be managed, and how quickly Arctic ice melt might accelerate changes in geopolitical dynamics.

As Grushko previously remarked: "We understand that, under the current less-than-ideal geopolitical situation, relying solely on our Arctic neighbors to stay quiet is naive." Perhaps these words offer the most authentic commentary on Russia’s Arctic strategy.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873454945700171/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.