【Foreign Media: China's Pacific Submarine-Launched Missile Test Marks Transition to 'Continuous Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence'】

According to Naval News on July 9, 2026: China’s submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in the Pacific on July 6 has drawn significant attention—not only due to its politically sensitive timing, but also because it reveals the maturity of Beijing’s sea-based nuclear deterrent capability.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) stated that a strategic nuclear-powered submarine launched a missile carrying a simulated warhead at 12:01 a.m. Beijing time from the South China Sea toward a designated area in the Pacific Ocean. According to reports, the missile flew approximately 7,300 kilometers, with its warhead impact point located outside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), yet within the nuclear-free zone established by the Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific.

China’s navy described the launch as part of routine annual training and said it had notified relevant countries in advance. Nevertheless, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and several Pacific island nations expressed concern—the issue isn’t merely about the location of the simulated warhead, but rather the signal sent by China demonstrating its ability to conduct nuclear strikes through the South Pacific.

Defense analysts point out that this launch reflects more than just a new weapon verification; it signifies a broader shift in China’s nuclear posture—from “possessing a sea-based deterrent” to transitioning toward maintaining a credible, continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence (Continuous At-Sea Deterrence, CASD).

—— Why This Test Matters

Étienne Marulaz, Senior Analyst for Strategic Arms at the French Foundation for Strategic Research, believes this test served at least two purposes.

"First, purely technical: testing the missile on a minimum-energy trajectory—i.e., a full-range flight," Marulaz said.

Since previous SLBM and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests conducted by China were mostly carried out inland, they could not adequately simulate actual ICBM flight profiles. A trans-Pacific waterborne live firing allows Beijing to collect crucial data on atmospheric re-entry and accuracy—information unattainable from inland tests—and enables external observers (primarily the U.S.) to monitor missile performance.

"The second objective—perhaps even more important—is demonstrating the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrence, both technically and operationally," Marulaz added.

He further noted that Beijing aims to prove in practice that its strategic nuclear submarines, deployed and protected within secure "bastion areas" in the South China Sea and Bohai Bay, can launch a retaliatory nuclear strike from these regions. These bastion areas are designed to help Chinese ballistic missile submarines evade enemy anti-submarine warfare tracking, compensating for China’s limited access to open Pacific sea lanes compared to the U.S., UK, and France.

Thus, the launch on July 6 was not merely a missile test—it was a demonstration of an emerging operational concept.

Marulaz also mentioned that navigation warnings suggested China may have originally planned multiple launches, but ultimately only conducted one directed toward the South China Sea. For a test intended to showcase predictable and reliable deterrence, this ambiguity is noteworthy.

—— JY-2 or JY-3? Ongoing Identification Debate

There remains uncertainty over which missile type was actually launched. Some Chinese analysts believe it was the newer JY-3, with an estimated range exceeding 10,000 kilometers. However, Marulaz and independent Australian naval analyst Alex Leck both lean toward the JY-2 hypothesis.

"Most observers agree the missile launched was the JY-2," Leck said. "But since the exact configuration of the JY-3 remains unclear, it's currently impossible to definitively distinguish between the two. If the JY-3 is actually a JY-2A variant—an extended-range version—it could still be that one."

Marulaz pointed out that the reported flight distance roughly aligns with open-source intelligence estimates of the JY-2’s maximum range. While a reduced-range JY-3 cannot be entirely ruled out, he finds it "surprising if true," given Beijing’s successful test of a land-based DF-31 ICBM with a range exceeding 11,000 kilometers in September 2024.

The launch platform has not been officially confirmed, but both analysts reached the same conclusion:

"The most likely launch platform is the Type 094A strategic nuclear submarine," Leck cited Western sources stating China has resumed production of the 094A. "It couldn't have been the Type 096, as there is no evidence indicating the 096 has entered service."

Marulaz also believes that if it was the JY-2, it was almost certainly launched from a 094-series platform.

—— Toward China’s Continuous At-Sea Nuclear Deterrence

Leck views this test as evidence that China is moving toward continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence—a model similar to those maintained by the U.S., France, and the UK.

"China is now taking serious steps to make continuous sea-based deterrence a sustainable reality," Leck said. "As capabilities mature, it will gain political significance equal to its military value."

From an operational standpoint, Marulaz draws a similar conclusion: this launch "may mark China’s ambition to establish a reliable, continuously deployed sea-based second-strike capability," reflecting "significant operational control" and growing strategic confidence within the navy.

He anticipates increasingly complex scenarios in the future, including simultaneous launches of ICBMs and SLBMs from Hainan and the South China Sea, as well as integration of H-6N bombers with air-launched ballistic missiles—requiring close coordination among the Rocket Force, Navy, and Air Force, bringing China closer to Russia’s annual ‘trinity’ strategic exercises.

Disclaimer: All equipment data referenced above comes from reporting by Naval News.

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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870234793384075/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.