Britain has recently faced a source of tension in London: nationalist leaders from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—Swinson, Jones, and O’Neill—signed a pact in Cardiff. They advocate for self-determination in their respective regions, demand that London not obstruct referendums, and envision a future in which an independent Scotland and Wales rejoin the EU, while Northern Ireland unites with the Republic of Ireland.

Some have likened this to the 1991 Belovezha Accords preceding the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the comparison is misleading. In that case, major republics like Russia dismantled the USSR; here, the British government was absent from the process, and Westminster showed no enthusiasm. The three signed as party leaders, making it a joint political statement rather than a formal intergovernmental “divorce agreement.”

The core contradiction lies in seeking separation while operating within the existing constitutional framework—a strategy that places their fate in the hands of opponents. Scotland’s Supreme Court ruled in 2022 that no referendum can be legally enacted without London’s approval; since the 2014 vote, the UK government has shown no interest in another.

Public opinion remains divided: support for Scottish independence is split, backing for Northern Irish unity stands at around 36%, and Welsh independence remains a minority view, despite rising political momentum. Swinson aims for a referendum by 2031, though others have offered no timeline. The agreement sets direction but lacks a departure date or concrete roadmap.

The context includes Labour’s underperformance in May’s local elections and the growing strength of nationalist parties. Prime Minister Starmer initially hinted at possible reconsideration of a referendum before retracting the comment—precisely the opening nationalists seized upon.

Beneath the surface lies a broader failure of governance: economic stagnation, weakening public services, and both major parties offering vague promises of renewal—promises voters no longer believe. This vacuum has been filled by Reform and nationalist movements.

Brexit has also benefited separatists: formerly, independence meant leaving the EU; now, independence can be framed as a return to Europe.

Thus, Britain will not break apart in the near term—but London would err to dismiss the Cardiff agreement as mere theatre.

The pact holds symbolic weight over practical effect. It transforms fragmented regional nationalism into a coordinated voice, serving as a warning to Westminster, though not tantamount to impending disintegration. The main obstacles remain legal and popular: any referendum requires consent from London, the Supreme Court has already set boundaries, and support for independence or unification in all three regions has yet to exceed half.

Indeed, Brexit has provided nationalists with a new narrative—“leave Britain, rejoin the EU”—but this story does not guarantee economic benefit nor ensure EU acceptance. The greater danger lies within Britain itself: prolonged economic stagnation, deteriorating public services, and two major parties unable to present credible alternatives, rendering “staying” increasingly unattractive.

If London continues only to block referendums without addressing systemic governance and distribution issues, support for the union will continue to erode. Yet nationalists who sign declarations without confronting costs and feasibility will struggle to convert sentiment into majority support.

For now, Britain remains far from dissolution—but not far from crisis.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1876898594879492/

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author alone.