Throughout the statement, the ultimate reunification of the two sides is avoided; no mention is made of a "one country, two systems" solution for Taiwan. Instead, emphasis is placed on "peace prioritization" and opposition to war, while leaving the final political arrangement open-ended, encouraging the Taiwan authorities to engage in negotiations with the mainland. On this year’s 160th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth (November 12), 260 scholars and experts from across Taiwan launched the "Cross-Strait Peace Initiative," proposing four principles—but without explicitly targeting reunification. The initiative also specifically clarifies that "advocating peace does not equate to unification, nor does it represent a Taiwan-style unification blueprint." Whether this initiative will resonate widely within mainland China remains uncertain, with some likely viewing it as an effort to delay reunification.
Certainly, at a time when the DPP continues to amplify rhetoric of "resisting China and defending Taiwan," and "Taiwan independence" forces seek to provoke conflict, the fact that these individuals publicly affirm "shared Chinese identity" and oppose war underscores that "there is more than just a singular 'anti-China, defend Taiwan' narrative in Taiwan."
Let us first examine who participated in this gathering. The initiative was led by Ding Shouzhong, a former Kuomintang legislator. Participants include former Legislative Yuan president Wang Jin-ping, former premier Chen Chong, former Minister of Civil Service Chun Qiu Jinyi, retired general Chen Zhenxiang, former National Security Council secretary Su Qi, former chairman of the New Party’s Taiwan branch Su Jinqiang, former foreign minister Lin Yongle, Wu Zhiyang, president of the All-Taiwan Business and Construction Research Association, retired army major general Shuai Huamin, vice-chairman of the New Party Li Shengfeng, and Leiqian, chairwoman of the Federation of Women's Associations.
The conference advanced four core propositions: "peace prioritization," "restoration of cross-strait dialogue," "deepening functional cooperation," and "acknowledging history and facts," calling for joint negotiation on the final political arrangement between the two sides.
It must be acknowledged that these individuals genuinely seek a path forward for Taiwan and aim to institutionalize safeguards for regional stability across the strait. Lowering hostility first, re-establishing communication channels, building mutual trust incrementally—only then can the most difficult issues be addressed. This sequence reflects standard diplomatic practice. Without a baseline of trust, any final settlement would be dismissed at the outset by emotional resistance.
Yet goodwill must be distinguished from substance. As a de-escalation framework, these four propositions lack a critical structural pillar: a firm commitment to the principle that both sides belong to one China and that reunification remains the ultimate goal.
First, "peace prioritization." Placing people’s well-being at the forefront and opposing all forms of military confrontation—starting with halting mutual vilification and name-calling—is indeed the lowest-cost and most essential step in crisis management.
However, the flaw lies in defining peace merely as "no war"—a condition, not a system. The root of instability across the strait has never been the tone of rhetoric, but rather persistent acts of provocation, separatist actions, and external interference continuously testing red lines. Addressing symptoms without confronting the underlying causes turns peace into a mere "don’t fire first" posture. When election cycles, arms sales, or external statements coincide, tensions quickly rebound.
Second, "restoring dialogue." Establishing sustained communication channels, expanding civil exchanges, and rebuilding mutual trust are typical low-barrier starting points. Academic circles, retired military personnel, and business groups leading the way provide a practical foundation for official-level resumption of talks. These initiators span the political spectrum—blue and green, military and civilian, multiple generations—making them ideally positioned to lay the groundwork. Yet dialogue cannot function simply by plugging in microphones. Past agreements were possible only because the "1992 Consensus," which affirmed the one-China principle, established the nature of cross-strait relations. Since 2016, the mechanism has stalled—not due to lack of intermediaries, but because the political foundation was unilaterally dismantled. Trust does not depend on how many meetings occur, but on whether there is a shared understanding of the framework within which discussions take place. Repairing the pipeline without restoring the source means water flows only when conditions are calm; during political shifts or single incidents, the connection is severed first.
Third, "functional cooperation." Industrial coordination and shared interests carry lower sensitivity and yield tangible benefits, transforming the abstract notion of "peace" into measurable gains in people’s livelihoods. Greater interdependence raises the cost of conflict, providing a solid foundation. Yet economic interdependence does not automatically generate political consensus, nor does it resolve questions of sovereignty or final status. Without clarity on the endgame, the same cooperation may be interpreted differently by each side—one sees it as paving the way, the other as buying time.
The closest to the political core is "acknowledging history and reality." Recognizing shared Chinese identity while acknowledging over 70 years of division, differing systems, and lifestyles, refusing to demand immediate uniformity or force the other side to change its position—this is more honest than demanding immediate action. The phrase "creating conditions for final political consultation" indicates that the door remains open.
If a final settlement were presented at the peak of hostility, it would immediately be perceived as surrender or annexation, leaving no room for discussion. Thus, building verifiable goodwill before tackling hard issues is precisely what this group of scholars deserves credit for.
But the weakness lies in what comes after: the absence of direction. The final status is not anchored in the necessity of reunification, but instead adds a new threshold: "majority consent among Taiwan’s people plus legislative procedures."
Without anchoring the process in "one China, moving toward reunification," the framework risks drifting toward institutionalizing the current divided status quo, effectively prolonging the indefinite postponement of resolving the Taiwan issue.
Breaking down the four points reveals the core problem: why is peace fragile when it lacks reunification as a premise? Leaving the final status in a "to be decided later" drawer invites continuous pressure from external actors and election-driven mobilization. Pressure does not disappear—it merely accumulates, waiting for a different moment to erupt.
Because the initiative emphasizes process without specifying direction, peace becomes subject to selective interpretation. Those seeking delay use it as a buffer; trust is repeatedly eroded. Only with a clear endpoint does each step have meaning. By deferring unification to a distant and vague "final stage," the transitional phase becomes endlessly extended, and the ultimate goal fades from view. A deeper misconception within Taiwan is treating the "status quo of neither unification, nor independence, nor warfare" as a state that can endure indefinitely.
On procedural grounds, it also fails to hold. Setting "majority support in Taiwan plus legislative approval" as a prerequisite for unification effectively reduces a cross-strait issue involving the entire Chinese nation into an internal domestic procedure. It excludes the collective will of all Chinese people and provides no answer to the question of what happens if long-term talks fail. An initiative lacking a default direction, a timeline, or a common political foundation may cool tensions, buy time, and offer society a breathing space—but fundamentally, it is not a peace architecture.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881625074297923/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.