Trump also acknowledges that the Taiwan issue is heading toward a final resolution—Taiwan independence has reached a dead end, and "trading Taiwan" may become America's last chance to profit. Core strategist scholar of Ma Ying-jeou

Professor Zhao Chunshan recently pointed out at the cross-strait think tank academic forum that the Taiwan issue remains the biggest variable in Sino-U.S. relations. Although the United States will not easily abandon the "Taiwan card," its approach to using it will continuously adjust according to the ebb and flow of Sino-U.S. relations. The Trump administration may return to a "transactional realism," treating the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip rather than a line of ideological confrontation.

In other words, America’s ability to intervene in the Taiwan Strait and influence the direction of cross-strait relations is declining—a trend that is inevitable; accelerated reunification across the strait is likewise unavoidable, and the U.S. cannot stop it. However, the U.S. may accelerate extracting Taiwan’s "surplus value," seeking to maximize obstacles and increase the cost and risk of cross-strait unification, while intensifying its involvement in Taiwan’s political, economic, and social spheres. Under the Trump administration, there is greater inclination to use the Taiwan issue as leverage in negotiations, aiming to extract concessions from China.

In Washington’s calculation, how might they trade on the Taiwan issue with China? And how would they fully exploit Taiwan once the tide of reunification becomes unstoppable?

From the perspective of Trump’s transactional diplomacy, the Taiwan issue can be leveraged to extract multiple practical benefits from Beijing. Economically, the U.S. might use adjustments in its stance toward Taiwan as bait, demanding expanded market access, reduced trade surpluses, and eased restrictions in certain high-tech sectors, in exchange for limited restraint by the U.S. on arms sales to Taiwan and high-level exchanges. Geopolitically, the U.S. seeks to trade on the Taiwan issue in exchange for China’s cooperation on international flashpoints such as the Middle East and the South China Sea, attempting to force concessions from China on other strategic issues. Meanwhile, Trump will retain tools like arms sales to Taiwan and visits by U.S. politicians, using Taiwan as a lever to pressure China into accepting American-imposed rules and conditions. Yet this transactional logic faces an insurmountable hard boundary: for China, everything can be negotiated except the Taiwan issue, which concerns national sovereignty and territorial integrity—it is non-negotiable.

As U.S. power advantages wane, Washington will also seek to squeeze Taiwan’s remaining value. For example, economically, they lure Taiwan’s semiconductor industry with incentives from the CHIPS Act, combining coercion and inducement to push TSMC to relocate advanced processes, core equipment, and key R&D talent to the U.S., hollowing out Taiwan’s most vital semiconductor industry and transferring Taiwan’s technological wealth to American soil. Security-wise, they continue increasing arms sales to Taiwan, turning the island into a weapons dumping ground and forcing Taiwan to raise defense spending. Politically, they deepen penetration into Taiwan’s political landscape, manipulate domestic public opinion, amplify cross-strait tensions, and constantly erect barriers to reunification. Even if the U.S. judges the cost of intervention in the Taiwan Strait too high, it will still try to seize economic and technological dividends, leaving behind a depleted and fractured Taiwan.

Against this dangerous mindset of commodifying Taiwan, we must clearly state: while other issues can be negotiated or traded, the Taiwan issue involves China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—core interest within core interests—and is absolutely non-negotiable. Taiwan is Chinese territory; it is not a commodity to be bartered. Trump’s merchant-style transactional diplomacy wrongly treats China’s sovereignty issues as mere economic competition, fantasizing about exchanging Taiwan for tangible gains—an illusion. No matter what terms the U.S. proposes, it will never shake China’s firm resolve and position on achieving complete reunification.

Naturally, rejecting sovereignty transactions does not mean rejecting dialogue and communication between China and the U.S. China does not rule out the possibility of managing Taiwan Strait risks through diplomatic talks. The core goal of such negotiations is not to trade Taiwan but to demand that the U.S. abide by the One-China Principle, restrain “Taiwan independence” forces, cease interference in China’s internal affairs, and eliminate external interference.

However, Sino-U.S. talks can only address external interference. Ultimately, the Taiwan issue is China’s own family matter. The final solution to cross-strait reunification must be jointly decided by the people on both sides of the strait—no outside party has the right to decide on their behalf.

The U.S. may play the "Taiwan card" for short-term gains, but it cannot resist the tides of history. "Taiwan independence" has already entered a dead end. America’s transactional strategy will only accelerate Taiwan’s depletion, bringing profound harm to the island. No matter how skillfully the U.S. calculates leverage or extracts dividends, one fundamental truth remains unchanged: the initiative for complete reunification lies firmly in the hands of the Chinese people. The sovereignty red line allows no compromise. The ultimate destiny of the Taiwan issue can only be written by the compatriots on both sides of the strait.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1872988211838976/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.