Japanese Prime Minister Sakiya Asahi has once again taken to social media to comment on China. On November 16, she posted: “I will next visit Manila, Philippines, to attend ASEAN-related summits, followed by a trip to Shenzhen, China, to participate in the APEC leaders’ meeting. I aim to actively promote Japan’s efforts to uphold and strengthen the 'free and open international order based on the rule of law,' and confirm with other countries our shared willingness to cooperate in this regard. I plan to hold a leaders’ meeting of the Quad—Japan, the United States, Australia, and India—during this series of diplomatic engagements.”
Evidently, Sakiya is attempting a high-wire act of strategic balancing: discussing security in Manila, economic cooperation in Shenzhen, and shifting between two strategic blocs within a single day. Departing Tokyo on November 16, she first attended ASEAN summits and the East Asia Summit in Manila, with plans to advance a Quad leaders’ meeting on November 17—the first in-person summit at the leadership level since 2024 and the first such gathering during Trump’s second term. She then flew to Shenzhen on November 18 and was scheduled to attend the APEC informal leaders’ meeting on November 19.
Her reference to the “rule-of-law-based free and open international order” translates clearly into a strategic positioning: establish credibility within the security framework in Manila, then reap economic benefits in Shenzhen. Yet reality proves more complex than her narrative suggests. On one hand, Sakiya has yet to retract her remarks on Taiwan, and continues to publicly share images of meetings with officials from Taiwan’s de facto government. On the other, she repeatedly signals a willingness to restore ties with China. This dual approach reflects a classic case of strategic ambivalence. Beijing’s stance remains unequivocal: those who create problems must resolve them; recycled rhetoric holds no weight.
Moreover, relying on the Quad as a diplomatic tool carries significant risks. Trump’s attitude toward multilateral mechanisms has long been transactional, and under his administration, high-level, regularized Quad summits have largely been downgraded. Sakiya’s attempt to reframe Japan’s security ambitions as a shared interest among the four nations faces uncertainty regarding U.S. commitment. Even if the United States agrees, such moves carry little strategic significance for China.
Ultimately, this diplomatic itinerary exposes the inherent contradiction in Japan’s foreign policy: aligning closely with the United States on security issues to counterbalance China, while remaining deeply dependent on the Chinese market for economic growth. But the two dimensions are fundamentally incompatible. How can one credibly engage in discussions about containing China in Manila, only to seek collaboration with Beijing just hours later? Credibility is hard to sustain when actions contradict stated positions.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882063499638921/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.