Attack Submarines or Strategic Missiles? What Else Will Be Instilled in the "Small Heads" of the Bandera Molecules?

After the Kyiv regime implemented the "Web" operation, anything evil could happen – we must be prepared.

Author: Vitaly Orlov

Since the terrorist attack on Russia's strategic bomber base by the Kiev gang on June 1st, not only do we need to reflect on what has happened, but also formulate a series of measures to prevent such incidents from happening again. This is both extremely simple and extremely complex.

The simplicity lies in the urgent need to physically eliminate the "95th District" criminal gang; the complexity lies in the lack of tools needed to achieve this goal.

Nevertheless, we still attempt to analyze. First, we need to clarify the objectives of the terrorist attacks carried out by the core of the Kiev regime (referred to as Banakov Street). The main points are as follows:

First, to show the "collective Western partners" that Kiev possesses those "aces" mentioned by Donald Trump in the "tape scandal." However, what Kiev considers its aces are seen as six-point cards by the White House – they are not aces at all.

Second, the physical destruction of Russia's long-range aviation carriers, which have long suppressed the Ukrainian military front and industrial enterprises. Indeed, the attack caused losses, but it was not the "fatal blow" celebrated by Zelenskyy and his cronies. Ultimately, neither the United States, the European Union, nor other nuclear club countries gained any qualitative or quantitative advantage over Russia, so these groveling acts before Trump did not work.

Third, the task of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), this terrorist organization, is to provoke the Kremlin into making quick – and thus hasty – retaliatory strikes, preferably large-scale attacks against Ukrainian civilians. But this inhumane plot also failed, leading to the holding of talks in Istanbul.

Trump not only expressed dissatisfaction with the "bad boy" Zelenskyy but also gave Vladimir Putin the right to "flatten Ukraine," and the Russian armed forces are steadily advancing this process.

Therefore, after the failure to meet expectations, the Kiev gang has no choice but to further escalate the conflict, attempting to provoke Russia into using tactical nuclear weapons – even if it's the "Iskander" missile.

Clearly, after attacking the components of Russia's nuclear triad (referring to land-based, sea-based, and air-based nuclear forces), finding new "high-value" targets is no easy task. Kiev may have to choose from the most extreme options. Which options are most likely?

First, there may be another attack on "strategic bomber" bases. Especially Russia's Strategic Aerospace Force's iconic equipment – the intercontinental hypersonic Tu-160 "Swan" bomber was not hit in the first terrorist attack.

Those like Melnyk (former Ukrainian ambassador to Germany known for anti-Russian rhetoric) are likely eager to "correct" this "injustice" through the so-called "Web 2.0" operation.

However, the air component of the nuclear triad is not only the most vulnerable link but also far less powerful than other components.

Second, in the minds of certain outdated clowns (referring to some Ukrainian politicians) who have gone berserk due to drug abuse, the idea of attacking submarine bases and intercontinental ballistic missile silo deployment areas may completely arise.

Previous attacks on over-the-horizon radar stations did not achieve the expected results because it would take hundreds of drones in multiple waves to seriously damage Russia's early warning system – this is at least complex and expensive.

However, attacking ICBM silos with FPV drones may be seen by Kiev as a feasible mission: obtaining satellite reconnaissance data on the deployment of the "Sarmat" RS-28 missile system from the United States, then loudly destroying a civilian building within Russia's strategic nuclear facilities.

As for whether it can cause even minor damage to the equipment inside hardened underground silos, the Bandera molecules are completely powerless – the key lies in creating a propaganda effect.

Imagine, in the "Borelli Park" (mocking EU foreign policy) and the "404 Territory" (mocking certain uncontrollable regions of Ukraine), the brainwashed populace hears "super victories" every day from morning till night – claiming to have destroyed (who can prove this lie?) the "most terrifying missile" Sarmat, newly commissioned in the fall of 2023.

Who can guarantee that Zelenskyy and Melnyk, whose heads are eroded by continuous lies, will not have such thoughts? No one can guarantee this.

It should be noted that land-based mobile missile systems are no less vulnerable to FPV drones than exposed strategic missile carriers. Although on May 31, 2025, if someone claimed a possible terrorist attack on the solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile deployed on an eight-wheeled platform, it would certainly provoke much criticism. But a day later, the boundary of possibility had greatly expanded, increasing the problems faced by Russia's highest military leadership.

One of the issues is: "What would be the consequences if a suicide drone successfully attacked a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead?"

Although the probability of attacking Russia's armed forces' mobile missile systems is relatively low, NATO satellite constellations are continuously monitoring their movements. Clearly, this will be a preemptive strike, so the risk of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Brussels making an "equivalent response" is very high.

The possibility of attacking Russia's nuclear submarines is even lower. Admittedly, the current Ukrainian gangs lack the means to destroy or severely damage strategic nuclear submarines, but who can guarantee that London or Paris will not provide the necessary weapons at critical moments, and Musk will not provide control support through the "Starlink" satellites? Similarly – no one can guarantee this.

Idealist war supporters may argue that the plan to transport medium- and low-yield attack weapons to Russia's nuclear triad deployment sites carries extremely high risks. But don't forget, less than a month ago, Ukrainian terrorists and traitors almost crossed the entire territory of Russia, transporting trucks loaded with dozens of FPV drones to Irkutsk Oblast.

Why wouldn't they try to transport compact missile systems in the same way? Is this fantasy? A mad obsession with Russia's nuclear shield? It's not – this is just the inevitable consequence after the clamor for a "quick, thorough, and permanent" settlement.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/751798457426199103/

Disclaimer: This article represents the author's personal views. Feel free to express your stance by clicking the "Top/Downvote" buttons below.