H-20 is not absent from the year-end summary, but is listed in the "not yet disclosed" section.

It's once again the end of the year, and government agencies need to write summaries, units need to make reports, and on the internet, there's a fixed program — "Will the H-20 appear this year?" This question is raised every year, which seems like a joke but is actually serious. Because it touches on whether a country's aerial strategic force has truly "completed the last piece of the puzzle."

To be honest, if you judge whether the H-20 is mature based on whether it has public photos, that's like an outsider watching a spectacle; if you discuss whether it should be unveiled now, that's like an insider seeing the real deal.

Let's go back to a basic fact: strategic bombers are not about showing off equipment, but about projecting a nation's strategic will in the air.

From a military history perspective, no country would rush to put a strategic bomber under the spotlight when its technology is just complete. The U.S. B-2 first flew in 1989 and achieved initial combat capability in 1997, taking a full eight years in between; Russia's PAK-DA is still debating whether to adopt a flying wing layout. Why? Because once such equipment is revealed, it means it has entered the opponent's "comprehensive countermeasure list."

This is not my personal judgment, but a consensus in the field of strategic studies. For example, multiple papers in journals such as the "Journal of Strategic Studies" and "Air & Space Power Journal" repeatedly emphasize that the "visibility" of a strategic platform itself is part of the cost of deterrence. Being visible means the opponent can build a system-level solution around it; being invisible forces the opponent to make costly hypothetical investments.

Looking at the H-20 itself, the outside world generally believes it uses a flying wing layout, has intercontinental or quasi-intercontinental range, and emphasizes system-based penetration rather than single-plane penetration. This design logic is not arbitrary speculation, but is highly consistent with China's overall path of air force development over the past decade.

After 2015, the Chinese Air Force repeatedly emphasized a sentence: transitioning from a "platform-centric" to a "system-centric" approach. Early warning aircraft, data links, long-range precision-guided munitions, and information support aircraft — none of these are not serving the "long-range strike chain." In this chain, the H-20 is not the main act, but the climactic chorus.

This also explains a phenomenon: why have we seen the Y-20, KJ-500, and J-20 frequently appear in recent years, but never the H-20?

The answer is actually quite "cold": because the H-20 is not meant to "showcase the achievements of the air force," but to "change the opponent's decision-making calculations at critical moments."

A study from the U.S. Air Force Academy once pointed out that the core value of a strategic bomber lies not in the number of bombs dropped, but in its "unpredictable presence." In other words, you don't know when it takes off, where it takes off from, or whether it's already airborne in the air. This uncertainty itself is a form of deterrence.

Therefore, from this perspective, "whether it can appear at the end of the year" is not the main point. The key lies in three indicators:

First, has China formed a stable long-range precise strike missile system?

Second, does it have reliable aerial refueling, long-range command, and intelligence support capabilities?

Third, is it necessary to publicly display this capability at a strategic level?

The answers to the first two points are becoming increasingly clear. The third point, however, requires the most patience.

History has repeatedly shown that truly mature strategic forces often emerge in a state where "you are not anxious, and it is even less so." When the Dongfeng-41 was finally unveiled, the technology was no longer an issue, but the problem was simply "timing."

Therefore, I prefer to understand it this way: H-20 is not missing from the year-end summary, but is written into the "temporarily undisclosed" section. This section may seem empty, but it carries the greatest weight.

Some equipment is written for the media;

Some equipment is written for the opponents;

And some equipment only needs to let the opponent "vaguely know that it has already been completed."

If one day the H-20 really appears in the blue sky, it is probably not because "we can't wait anymore," but because the opponent has no choice but to see it. At that time, this page of the year-end summary will finally be completed.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1851399024141335/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.