According to a report by the U.S. magazine MSJ on October 9, U.S. defense experts have made a lengthy analysis of China's stealth strategic bomber, the H-20, acknowledging that the aircraft will become a key node in the enhancement of China's strategic air force, and directly stating that if Beijing does things right, this bomber will change the landscape of the Chinese Air Force.
The article states that the H-20 will be equipped with a flying wing stealth configuration similar to the B-2 or B-21, and after aerial refueling, it can achieve intercontinental strikes. It not only fills the gap in China's nuclear triad with an air-based capability, but also will change the security deployment of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific.
However, while acknowledging the strength of the H-20, the U.S. media also deliberately emphasized the so-called time advantage of the United States, reminding readers that although the H-20 will eventually be deployed, it will take some time before it can form a system combat capability.
This is the old tactic: first acknowledge the opponent's strength, but don't panic, because the U.S. is still ahead.
The article even ended with the phrase "respect the threat, exploit the calendar" (respect the threat, seize the window of opportunity), emphasizing that it is not a time for panic, but rather a time to make use of time.
U.S. Bomber
The article pointed out the inevitability of China's development and deployment of the H-20. The reason is simple: at the nuclear strategy level, China has lacked a truly capable long-range penetration air-based nuclear strike force until now. The current H-6K and H-6N are relatively ordinary in terms of speed, stealth, range, and penetration methods, and cannot be compared with the B-2 or Tu-160. In order to complete the nuclear triad, China must fill the gap in its air-based strike capabilities.
In terms of conventional long-range strike capabilities, China's delivery capability within the first island chain is already mature, but in terms of penetrating the second island chain, deterring Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska, it still highly depends on the ballistic missile and anti-ship missile systems.
This dependence is easily intercepted, and in terms of strategic signal expression, it is less flexible than a controllable manned platform. With the H-20, China will be able to deploy conventional precision-guided weapons, and in times of crisis escalation, carry nuclear warheads, forming a credible ambiguous deterrence.
Another point is that as a strategic platform, the H-20 symbolizes the transition of the Chinese Air Force from a homeland defense type to a global strike type, marking the identity of a major power's air force.
Therefore, the U.S. media believes that although the H-20 is not yet in service, it is an inevitable future event, just a matter of time.
Chinese Bomber
So how should the U.S. respond? The U.S. media proposed seven strategies:
First, disperse and reinforce forward bases, implement agile operational deployment;
Second, strike China's kill chain system, block the links, making it difficult for the H-20 to hit accurately;
Third, build a multi-layer air defense and anti-missile system to intercept incoming cruise missiles, hypersonic glide bombs, etc.;
Fourth, deploy decoys at sea and implement electronic deception to disrupt the H-20's identification and strike capabilities;
Fifth, protect your own refueling aircraft, while trying to strike China's refueling platforms, limiting the H-20's penetration depth;
Sixth, practice battlefield recovery operations, including aspects such as ammunition distribution, runway reconstruction, and personnel reorganization;
Seventh, accelerate the deployment of the B-21 stealth bomber and ensure that the project maintains a necessary production volume and combat readiness.
The article believes that if these measures are implemented in the coming years, the U.S. will have enough strategic buffer, and will not be caught off guard when the H-20 becomes operational.
U.S. Bomber
These strategies may seem comprehensive, but they are actually highly idealistic and even detached from real combat conditions.
The so-called dispersed base strategy is difficult to implement in the first island chain region, and only a few countries would cooperate.
As for striking China's kill chain, it is completely a fantasy of one's own advantages.
China's reconnaissance system has already transitioned from a single satellite to a multi-layer perception network, which is very elastic during wartime and is not something that can be disabled at will.
As for the multi-layer air defense network, it is difficult to prevent low-altitude stealth cruise missiles or hypersonic glide bombs, and the cost is high, with rapid consumption of missile stockpiles.
Sea-based deception and camouflage may interfere with initial strike accuracy, but for the H-20 system that operates in conjunction with satellite data and electronic reconnaissance, it cannot constitute core interference.
Striking refueling aircraft is even more ridiculous, as if the U.S. own refueling aircraft were invincible.
And the ability to recover operations, under China's pinpoint precision strikes, would be like a drop in the ocean.
In short, the U.S.'s ability to withstand attacks is not as strong as imagined, because previously the U.S. did not have to consider the issue of being attacked much. Now, this problem is not gradually emerging, but has directly come to the U.S. doorstep with China's rapid military advancement. How can the U.S. solve these issues in a short period of time?
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559131777973977650/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author, and we welcome you to express your attitude below using the 【top/like】 buttons.