4433 words in this article
Estimated reading time: 11 minutes
Author | Joshua T. White
Translated by | Chen Zhuo, Cao Yincang
Translation Reviewer | Mao Keji
Editor of this issue | Zhu Yilin
Reviewer of this issue | Shan Minmin
Editor's Note
Although the smoke of the latest India-Pakistan conflict has temporarily faded, the strategic fog remains. Former White House South Asia coordinator and professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Joshua T. White, wrote an article based on his years of research on South Asian security issues, revealing four core risks of this crisis: first, the failure of the accountability mechanism, where the international community quickly blamed Pakistan, leading to significant pressure on Indian public opinion, which may prompt India to take more radical cross-border strikes in the future. Second, drones are changing the rules of war, with both India and Pakistan using large numbers of drones, blurring the threshold for conflict escalation, and increasing the risk of misjudging the nature of attacks. Third, information warfare is exacerbating strategic miscalculations, with both sides interfering with decision-making through information operations. Fourth, the dangerous shift in arms race, where India's precision strike capabilities may prompt Pakistan to revise its military doctrine, shifting from "gradual retaliation" to "pre-emptive strikes." White believes that the most dangerous legacy of the current crisis is the establishment of a new conflict model: "drone harassment + information fog + rapid accountability." In this model, the speed of future crises will far exceed the expectations of decision-makers. The article finally warns that when drone swarms replace traditional artillery as the standard for conflicts, the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia is facing the most severe challenge since the end of the Cold War. The South Asia Research Newsletter translates this article for your critical reference.
Figure source: Internet
After days of fighting and countermeasures, the India-Pakistan ceasefire agreement mediated by the United States seems to have been temporarily maintained. However, both sides quickly began a struggle over narratives, using self-defensive and self-praising rhetoric to claim victory, but with varying degrees of credibility. At the same time, both sides began to claim, in a hindsight manner, that they had always been cautious in managing risks to avoid unintended escalation of the conflict.
We should be highly skeptical of such statements. The developments during this round of India-Pakistan conflict were full of spontaneous and opportunistic elements, leading to an unsettling battlefield fog - which is particularly dangerous for conflicts between two nuclear-armed countries. Although the fog of war still covers many basic facts, one thing is becoming increasingly certain: this is the most dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan in a quarter of a century.
The impact of this crisis on India, Pakistan, and the South Asian region is difficult to fully assess, but four trends are emerging, which will profoundly affect the direction of future crises:
First, the international community clearly favors India on the issue of "accountability," but this may increase political pressure after future terrorist attacks, leading to hasty responses. Second, when choosing targets for military strikes, both Indian and Pakistani militaries have worryingly broken conventions, which will affect future military planning and significantly increase the risk of conflict. Third, information warfare is upgrading from a supporting means to a core part of wartime operations, which is particularly evident in the Pakistani defense system. Fourth, the widespread use of drones and loitering munitions makes it more difficult for both sides to predict the prospects of conflict. These changes will increase the unpredictability of future crises.
One, Beyond Accountability
Similar to most India-Pakistan crises over the past three decades, this conflict also started with an attack in the Indian-controlled area. On April 22nd, a horrifying massacre occurred in Pahalgam, killing 25 Hindu tourists and 1 Muslim tour guide. India quickly acted, convincingly attributing the attack to an organization associated with the "Lashkar-e-Taiba" (LeT) inside Pakistan, while Pakistan claimed it was a "false flag operation."
What shocked people was that after this brutal attack, the investigation into the identity of the attackers and their connection to Pakistan was surprisingly weak. The reason behind this is simple: Over the past decade, the United States and other key Indian allies have adopted India's habitual thinking - directly blaming Pakistan for terrorist attacks based on historical trajectories of Pakistan's long-term support for anti-India armed groups, rather than fair specific evidence.
This shift is partially due to India's successful diplomatic efforts - guiding and persuading allies to skip the verification process, viewing calls for investigation as a delaying tactic. The United States has long suffered from terrorist organizations based in Pakistan, and India's growing geostrategic and economic trade appeal globally undoubtedly contributed to this development.
The current pre-established position of the international community is valuable for India because it provides space for a quick response to future terrorist attacks. However, this also encourages simplistic thinking within India, viewing accountability as an "automatic procedure." While the Indian leadership successfully guided allies to pre-accuse Pakistan, it now needs to manage domestic public expectations, especially addressing the tendency to prioritize revenge over verification.
The Indian leadership seems willing to avoid open discussions about the specific connections between terrorists and Pakistani institutions, even if it means bearing additional pressure. This cannot be blamed on them. The Pakistani military indeed allows a large number of armed groups to operate without restrictions on its territory. As I stated in my new book "Vigilante Islamists: Religious Parties and Anti-State Violence in Pakistan," these organizations have complex relationships with Pakistani parties and state institutions, and their ideologies align with senior military officials. Although the framework of cooperation is clear, details of specific actions are hard to find.
By weakening the accountability process, India successfully compressed the space for Pakistan to delay, deny, or internationalize the next crisis. However, the cost of this is that the Indian government may find it harder to quell the rising tide of chauvinistic public opinion demanding immediate and intense retaliation.
Two, Focusing on Concerns
Both India and Pakistan need to be wary of the dangerous precedents set by this conflict in catalyzing the escalation of crises. The first round of Indian strikes targeted the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Muridke and the buildings of the "Jaish-e-Mohammed" in Bahawalpur. This target selection clearly conveyed a "tooth for a tooth" message: punishing terrorism by striking the bases of terrorists. However, this action also consumed two "premium targets" on Modi's list, which had the lowest political risk and the strongest symbolic significance.
If another terrorist attack occurs, India may be forced to take more radical actions, needing to go deep into Pakistan to strike targets with similar political and operational value. However, under pressure, India might choose targets outside of terrorist infrastructure, such as striking secondary intelligence or military facilities in Pakistan, or combining counter-terrorism operations with special operations or naval activities to demonstrate the seriousness of its actions. However, any of these types of actions would inevitably bring new risks of escalation.
After this confrontation, Pakistan faces strategic concerns that are symmetrical to India's, but in different forms. Indian weapons not only crossed the border for cross-border strikes, but also demonstrated precise strike capabilities against key defensive nodes. Although the Indian Air Force's raids on Nur Khan air base (adjacent to the Pakistani Army headquarters) and other important airports did not cause major damage, the choice of targets already indicated India's intention to challenge Pakistan's air defense system and threaten core strategic assets.
When air defense systems become targets, the military is easily anxious - worried about losing control of key command nodes and possibly misjudging试探性 attacks as the prelude to a full-scale offensive. This anxiety could reshape Pakistan's military doctrine, prompting it to adopt earlier mobilization and faster escalation strategies in future conflicts.
Three, Information Warfare
One of the professional risks of being a defense researcher is having to read various foreign military journals, sifting out real theoretical advances from the confident texts. Over the past decade, I noticed a surge in discussions about information warfare in Pakistani defense journals, initially viewing these articles as trendy imitations, perhaps a rough imitation of China's "informationized warfare" theory. But now, I think my judgment may have been premature.
It seems that the Pakistani military has invested a lot in shaping the information environment, with some methods quite technically sophisticated. For example, on the night of May 8th-9th, it denied the attack on India, successfully interfering with the direction and control of India's subsequent retaliatory actions during the crisis. However, some other operations seemed absurd. For instance, the official statement that Indian ballistic missiles targeted the Sikh population in Punjab clearly manipulated ethnic sensitivities.
Although the Indian official accounts also sought to shape the information environment, they appeared clumsy and passive, with press conferences often lagging behind events by several hours, which left room for the wild growth of Indian media. In the vacuum of information, the extremely competitive Indian media pushed them to sensationalize rumors such as "Karachi Port destroyed" and "Pakistani Army Chief placed under house arrest." These exaggerated claims later seem ridiculous, but in the tense atmosphere at the time, they could have pressured decision-makers to take excessive actions or sent chaotic signals to the Pakistani decision-making circle.
We should not overestimate the impact of these information noises on actual military operations, as war is inherently full of fog. However, viewing them as a gradual evolution would be short-sighted. The increasingly aggressive information campaigns by Pakistan, combined with India's passionate and extremely irresponsible media ecology, are laying the groundwork for new major risks of strategic miscalculations in future crises.
Four, Drone Warfare
The most influential military development in this crisis was the large-scale use of drones and loitering munitions. Defense officials from both countries confirmed that hundreds of drones were launched over four nights, ranging from micro quadcopters to long-endurance combat platforms, most of which executed one-way strike missions. This mutually attacking drone warfare broke new ground, with reconnaissance, precision strikes, interception and countermeasures, and electronic deception intertwined.
Given that both India and Pakistan are closely studying the experiences of the Ukraine conflict, the widespread participation of drones in the conflict was expected. However, the actual application by both sides is worrying for two reasons. First, a large number of disposable drones are used as "drones," specifically to lure the enemy into wasting expensive air defense missiles. Although this tactic is reasonable, as mentioned earlier, the test attacks on radar and launch positions are easily misinterpreted as the prelude to a full-scale offensive.
Second, we saw a new emerging "grammar" in this conflict. Traditional artillery exchanges are frequent along the disputed control lines, but the risk of escalation is limited. However, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, which combine speed and destructive power, are at the top of the risk spectrum, as they could trigger a nuclear response alert. Drones and loitering munitions fall exactly in the middle of these two extremes.
The relatively calm reaction of both armies to nighttime drone swarm operations suggests that these equipment may be widely and "non-escalatory" used in future conflicts. However, the ambiguous definition of "missiles" and "drones" by both sides, coupled with the interference of a noisy information environment, still leaves room for miscalculation - especially when key radars or air defense nodes are attacked, which can easily trigger an overreaction.
Five, Lessons Learned
Both sides will accelerate to absorb the lessons from this conflict and adjust their military procurement and operational plans accordingly. Pakistan is likely to deepen its integration with China's industrial base and expand its drone cooperation with Turkey. Although the Pakistani Air Force performed well in air combat, part of its achievements actually benefited from the ground air defense systems deployed along the border, which intercepted Indian aircraft crossing the border. Subsequent damage assessments may reveal that the scale and reliability of Pakistan's air defense system are both questionable, as well as the limitations of drone swarm attacks' effectiveness - these drones caused little destruction in India's territory.
India faces a more complex choice. Its air defense network performed stably, and the coordination between land and air forces showed the capability for cross-border strike operations. However, the crisis exposed two major issues that India urgently needs to address - improving missile ammunition reserves to cope with prolonged warfare, and perfecting coordination mechanisms for multi-front operations.
Currently, the Indian military equipment system can be described as a "global brand": Israeli drones, Russian-Indian air defense systems, French aircraft, American reconnaissance aircraft, and domestically produced drones coexist. How to integrate these heterogeneous equipment into a joint operation system covering two land battlefronts and a vast sea area has become the core challenge of India's military modernization. This will force the Indian government to focus its massive national defense localization strategy on a few carefully selected areas.
This round of India-Pakistan conflict will also fuel the ongoing controversy over military procurement: whether to continue importing proven combat-tested Russian air defense systems, or to opt for unproven fifth-generation fighters? Can the latter form extensive and resilient coordination with existing Western high-end equipment? Referring to the remarks of the Trump administration linking trade to a ceasefire, will India's choice of advanced American platforms like the F-35 give the US too much influence on India's security affairs?
Finally, it must be anticipated that both countries' land and naval forces will seriously review how to avoid becoming spectators in the next conflict. Fortunately, during this crisis, all military branches were highly vigilant but basically remained in reserve status. However, we must be cautious: hasty retaliation without proper verification, provocative cross-border target selection, chaotic information warfare, and the combined effect of drone technology may make future crises escalate faster, be less transparent, span a wider front, and have greater destructive power. These potential risks deserve continued attention from the strategic community.
About the Author: Joshua T. White, a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution's Asia Policy Center, is a foreign policy researcher.
This article is translated from a Brookings Institution commentary published on May 14, 2025, titled "Lessons for the next India-Pakistan war". The original link is:
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/lessons-for-the-next-india-pakistan-war/。
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7561825998434550312/
Declaration: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion by clicking the [upvote/downvote] buttons below.