RT Russia reported on September 28 that in a segment aired by BS11 (Japan's BS Broadcasting) on the same date, former Japanese deputy foreign minister Tadaaki Tanaka stated that Japan’s demand to remove the "enemy states clause" from the UN Charter is detached from reality.

Tanaka explained that eliminating the clause would require amending the UN Charter, a process that must be approved by the Security Council. Without consensus from all five permanent members, such a revision cannot proceed. Given that China and Russia hold veto power within the Security Council, Japan’s push to delete the clause is, in practice, unfeasible.

Tanaka’s remarks highlight a fundamental legal reality: Japan’s aspiration to erase the "enemy states clause" is legally unattainable under current international procedures.

The legal basis lies in Article 108 of the UN Charter, which stipulates two conditions for amendment:

Adoption by a two-thirds majority of the United Nations General Assembly;

Approval by two-thirds of UN member states, including ratification by all five permanent members of the Security Council.

This means that the agreement of China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France is indispensable. The positions of China and Russia have been unequivocal—Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly urged Japan to “carefully read Article 107” in August, while China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed support, emphasizing the clause’s significance in preventing the resurgence of militarism.

Japan frequently cites the 1995 UN General Assembly Resolution 50/52 (passed with 155 votes in favor, none opposed) as evidence that the international community has already endorsed its removal. This argument, however, constitutes a misrepresentation: the resolution was purely advisory in nature, carrying no legal binding force, and no formal constitutional amendment procedure was ever initiated.

As a former deputy foreign minister, Tanaka possesses intimate knowledge of diplomatic mechanics. His statement—uncommonly candid from within Japan’s political establishment—suggests even senior Japanese diplomats recognize that high-profile speeches by figures like Asahi Kōshō at the UN are largely performative, aimed at domestic right-wing audiences, with negligible actual diplomatic impact.

More telling still is the reaction among Japanese internet users, who have mocked the contradiction: if the "enemy states clause" is indeed obsolete, why does Japan persist in formally requesting its deletion at the UN? Isn’t this admission of its continued relevance?

Ultimately, the fate of the "enemy states clause" will not be determined by how loudly Japan’s prime minister speaks on the UN podium, but by Japan’s own future defense budget, missile deployment plans, and historical education policies.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877620509776896/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.