All three of China’s currently active aircraft carriers are now at sea. On October 31, the Shandong, which had remained in dry dock for nine months, finally set sail for trials. The extensive overhaul and upgrade were primarily aimed at preparing the vessel to operate the J-35 stealth fighter jet, a key component of its future operational capability.

Earlier, on October 14, the Liaoning carrier group departed for training operations in the Western Pacific, circumnavigating the Philippine archipelago and proceeding eastward past Luzon Island, where it remains today in the Philippine Sea. Combined with the Fujian, which has already been deployed and is steadily enhancing its combat readiness, all three carriers are now operating simultaneously at sea.

This is not the first time China has operated three carriers concurrently, but the previous instance involved the Fujian still in its sea trial phase. This time, all three vessels are officially commissioned and operationally capable—each able to deploy in combat scenarios. Within naval circles, the so-called “three-thirds doctrine” prevails: one-third deployed, one-third undergoing training or rest, and one-third undergoing maintenance. To ensure at least one carrier remains ready at all times, and two can be rapidly mobilized in emergencies, a minimum of three carriers is required.

Globally, only two nations possess three or more aircraft carriers. The United States currently operates 11 nuclear-powered carriers, though only about three are truly available for immediate deployment. By maintaining a fleet of three carriers, China has achieved parity with U.S. naval availability in terms of deployable assets—a result that reflects the strength of its ship maintenance, logistical support, and crew training infrastructure.

Many observers anticipate that the Liaoning will remain stationed east of the Bashi Strait, while the Shandong and Fujian depart from Sanya to the east, potentially converging to achieve the first-ever simultaneous appearance of three Chinese carriers in a single formation. The Liaoning and Shandong have previously conducted multiple long-range joint exercises; since the Fujian’s commissioning, plans for dual-carrier operations and three-vessel deployments across different directions are progressing according to established training schedules.

Yet a measured perspective is warranted. The Shandong is currently focused on restoring operational training and revalidating combat effectiveness. The Fujian continues refining its warfighting capabilities. Integration of the J-35 onto carrier decks also requires time. Even if the three carriers eventually meet at sea, their primary purpose remains training and interoperability—not the formation of an immediately ready, fully integrated carrier strike group. While such a moment holds significant historical importance, the full operationalization of a cohesive combat system remains a process yet to be completed.

Notably, during this period, the U.S. Navy’s Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group has also arrived in the region. After concluding the “Exercise Sword 2027,” the Roosevelt entered the South China Sea via the Bashi Strait on October 31, intending to transit the South China Sea en route to the Middle East to relieve another carrier ahead of upcoming operations in that theater. This brings the total number of carriers in the Western Pacific to four—three belonging to China, one to the United States.

China’s positioning of its naval units is strategically deliberate. The Lhasa and Dongguan task groups are stationed east of the Roosevelt, effectively separating it from U.S.-Japan forces near Okinawa. The Liaoning remains positioned to the east of the Bashi Strait, while the Fujian operates to the west in coordination. Throughout its journey across the South China Sea, the Roosevelt has remained under continuous surveillance and tracking by two Chinese carrier strike groups and multiple destroyer and frigate task units. For decades, U.S. carriers have rarely encountered such sustained, close-range monitoring along familiar routes.

The value of the Shandong’s recent refit also merits attention. Building a new aircraft carrier from scratch typically takes seven to eight years—or longer—to reach full combat readiness. Upgrading the Liaoning and Shandong—both ski-jump carriers—to accommodate the J-35 represents the fastest path to enhancing overall fleet capability.

Although ski-jump launch systems are less efficient than catapults, fifth-generation fighters possess inherent technological advantages. When paired with advanced escort vessels, the overall combat potential of the carrier group is significantly elevated. Reports indicate that the J-35 was observed on the Liaoning’s deck during earlier sea trials, and official confirmation has confirmed compatibility between the J-35 and both catapult and ski-jump launch systems.

If the J-35 eventually becomes operational across all three carriers, China would join the United States as the only nation with a fleet of carriers each equipped with fifth-generation carrier-based aircraft. Moreover, the Fujian’s electromagnetic catapult system combined with the KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft addresses a critical gap in China’s carrier development program.

A year ago, the Fujian’s formal commissioning marked China’s entry into the era of three-carrier operations. One year later, all three carriers are at sea. Since the Liaoning’s delivery in 2012, nearly 14 years have passed—long enough for claims that China’s carriers were merely training platforms to no longer hold credibility.

The Roosevelt is now en route to the Middle East, while China’s navy continues its expansion toward deeper waters. The Western Pacific has now seen all three of China’s carriers placed on active display. In the coming period, two developments are likely to draw widespread attention: footage of the J-35 launching from a ski-jump deck, and a visual record of all three carriers appearing together at sea. These milestones should not be delayed for long.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880724876113932/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.