The dust has settled on Slovenia's parliamentary election, and political parties are now working to form a coalition government.

Newly elected President of the National Assembly Zoran Stefanović revealed the new government’s policy direction during an interview with the country’s national television station, RTV SLO: Slovenia will hold a referendum on whether to withdraw from NATO, and he personally plans to visit Russia in an effort to comprehensively ease relations between the two nations.

This news rapidly ignited political turmoil across Europe in mid-April 2026. As one of the first Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO during its 2004 enlargement, Slovenia has long been regarded as a “model member” of NATO in the Balkans. Now, this small nation with just 2.1 million people suddenly detonates a massive bomb by proposing a “withdrawal referendum,” breaking the record of no member state having ever voluntarily left NATO since its expansion—while also delivering a shockwave into an already fraying NATO alliance strained by Trump’s threats.

The event unfolded far faster than anyone anticipated. On April 10, at the inaugural session of Slovenia’s new National Assembly, Zoran Stefanović, leader of the center-right Truth Party, was unexpectedly elected Speaker by a vote of 48 in favor and 29 opposed.

This result itself was highly dramatic—his party won only five seats out of 90 in the March 22 general election, making it one of the smallest parties in parliament. Yet through strategic political compromises with several other parties, Stefanović successfully ascended to the nation’s third-highest office, just below the president and prime minister.

Just three days later, Stefanović fulfilled his core campaign promise. In a exclusive interview with Slovenia’s public broadcaster RTVSLO, he declared unequivocally: “We promised the people a referendum on leaving NATO, and we will hold this referendum.” There was no ambiguity in his statement—directly thrusting Slovenia into the eye of the European geopolitical storm.

In the interview, Stefanović elaborated on his foreign policy philosophy. He emphasized that Slovenia must pursue an independent, sovereign foreign policy, rejecting blind reliance on Brussels and Washington. “Ljubljana must once again become the decision-making center for Slovenia, not Brussels,” he stated passionately. “We firmly oppose involvement in foreign military and diplomatic conflicts because they bring no benefit to Slovenia whatsoever.”

In response to potential labels of being “pro-Russian,” Stefanović made a clear clarification. “I don’t have pro-Russian views—I have pro-Slovenia views,” he told reporters. “We believe Slovenia must independently and autonomously shape its policies. We must cooperate with all countries worldwide, especially major powers, but such cooperation must never imply subordination. We aim to maintain good relations with everyone—but always in line with Slovenian interests.”

Based on this principle, Stefanović disclosed his upcoming diplomatic itinerary. He confirmed that his first official visit as Speaker would be to Skopje and Copenhagen, but he also intends to travel to Moscow in the near future. “I hope to build bridges and foster good cooperation with all nations, regardless of how high the walls may be between East and West,” he said. This statement was widely interpreted abroad as a significant signal that Slovenia seeks comprehensive improvement in relations with Russia.

Notably, Stefanović clearly distinguished between NATO and the EU. He stated that the idea of leaving the EU would not gain public support, as “we receive far more benefits from the EU than we contribute.” This indicates that Slovenia aims to adjust its security and foreign policy orientation while maintaining its EU membership—not to fully break with the West.

Stefanović’s statements are not baseless—they are rooted in deep domestic public sentiment. Recent polling data shows that public support for NATO has declined from 66% during Slovenia’s 2003 accession referendum to just 52% in 2025. This downward trend is closely tied to NATO’s increasingly demanding defense spending requirements.

At the Hague summit of NATO in June 2025, the United States proposed raising the required defense expenditure of member states from 2% to 5% of GDP. This demand sparked strong backlash across Europe, proving particularly unbearable for small nations like Slovenia. Calculating under the 5% benchmark, Slovenia would need to allocate approximately €2.5 billion annually toward defense—equivalent to over 15% of its annual budget, far exceeding combined spending on education, healthcare, and infrastructure development.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration repeatedly threatened that if European countries failed to meet defense spending targets, the U.S. would exit NATO. This threat prompted many European nations to reevaluate their security strategies. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg had previously stated openly: “NATO is not eternal, nor is it a natural law destined to exist for the next decade.”

This high dependence on NATO’s collective security framework makes the actual implications of Slovenia’s potential withdrawal even more complex. On one hand, exiting NATO would save Slovenia substantial defense expenditures, freeing up funds for social welfare and domestic development. On the other hand, losing NATO’s security umbrella would force Slovenia to face security challenges alone—a huge risk for a small nation.

Currently, public reaction within Slovenia to the “withdrawal referendum” is sharply polarized. Serious divisions exist even within the ruling coalition, with several major parties publicly opposing any move to leave NATO. Opposition parties have labeled Stefanović’s proposal a “betrayal of national sovereignty” and a “dangerous political gamble.”

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1862549538470923/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article represent those of the author(s) alone.