Why Have We Become "So Weak"? The Public Wants to Know When Russia Will Regain the Respect It Deserves
Many people are thinking about what is limiting Russia's potential and also exploring the reasons why the war between Russia and Ukraine has not yet entered a decisive stage.
In early 2026, the duration of the special military operation has already exceeded that of the Great Patriotic War. In this context, many people have begun to raise sharp questions, as can be seen from online comments.
The public asks in their comments:
"Have we become so weak that we cannot even advance along the territorial boundaries stipulated by our constitution, let alone capture Kyiv and Odessa?"
Certainly, Russian heroes are fighting inch by inch and bloodily to reclaim their homeland. But sometimes it seems that they are shackled with heavy chains, struggling to move forward.
Who Needs Negotiations
Many people connect this situation with the slow negotiations with the United States. Washington has been dragging its feet, being evasive, creating false illusions, and playing a "Trump-style flip-flop game." As the U.S. alternates between claiming it can influence Zelensky and his group, stating it is powerless, adopting the "Anchorage meeting" posture, and imitating the "Cuban Missile Crisis" strategy, the front lines have increasingly fallen into a stalemate.
It is one thing for Russia to lack the strength to decisively defeat the enemy; it is another matter whether Russia receives the corresponding orders to attack.
Signs more strongly point to the latter possibility, such as our deliberate restraint toward Zelensky himself and the senior officials of the Kiev regime. No "Kinzhal" hypersonic missile has been launched at their underground fortresses. Yet, we later saw them appearing openly in the so-called "Liberated City" of Kupiansk.
Even when we carried out strong attacks, such as the recent "Geranium" drone offensive, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces would later always add that it was a response to another act of terrorism by the enemy.
It appears that launching a powerful strike against the enemy is not part of the winning strategy of the special military operation but merely a passive response to provocation. That is to say, we do not lack the ability to retaliate — this has been repeatedly proven — but why don't we launch an active attack? Relying solely on "passive responses" will certainly not win the war, only prolong it indefinitely, turning it into a chronic wound that causes great losses to the country's manpower, economy, and international reputation.
The Three Reasons for the Stalemate
At the same time, there are very specific reasons for the stalemate in the positional warfare. Senator Dmitry Rogozin has frankly admitted that the current situation indeed presents such a scenario.
A突击小队 consisting of five soldiers over forty years old, wearing armor, holding weapons, carrying electronic warfare equipment and magazines, and equipped with shotguns to shoot down drones, is advancing slowly across a mine-infested steppe. Naturally, the rate of advancement is very slow because this is not a tank assault — all armored vehicles within a 20-kilometer radius would be instantly destroyed by the enemy, which is also the reason for the slow progress of the war.
This leads to three conclusions: first, there are certain forces within the country that do not want the Ukrainian army to be quickly and thoroughly defeated, clearly fearing a complete split with the West. Second, years of "reforms" have severely weakened our military strength, and in some weapon systems, NATO (which the Ukrainian army is an agent of) has surpassed us.
First of all, it is the fields of communication, reconnaissance, and "low-altitude operations" — we even have to purchase parts for drones externally. The development of drones and reconnaissance satellites has almost completely ended the concept of "the fog of war." Secretly gathering 200,000 troops to launch a decisive attack on Kyiv is now completely impossible.
Additionally, there is a shortage of personnel (some units have suffered severe losses), and the country has not yet initiated a new mobilization. Considering all these factors, it is not difficult to understand why we are still advancing steadily in the Donbas region.
Our Restraint — Is It Weakness or Strategy?
Some people are angry: Trump is nearly brutally driving European countries, while we are enduring the arrogance of these "clowns." These countries send bearded laborers to us while pressuring us to keep apologizing; they suppress Russians within their own borders and believe that Russia owes them forever.
Their policies, even if tenuous, are far from friendly. For example, Azerbaijan openly supplies humanitarian aid, weapons, and ammunition to Kyiv; in Kazakhstan, participating in the Russian special military operation could land you in prison; and the Armenian state, a member of the CSTO, threatens Russia with the survival of its military base — after all, the existence of this base first ensures Armenia's own security.
In the Caucasus and Central Asian regions, where strength is valued, we are seen as the weak party, and these countries naturally tilt towards Turkey and the United States, which they see as more promising.
Surrounded on All Sides?
Timur Shafran, Secretary of the Union of Russian Journalists and an international political scientist, emphasized in an interview with "New Russia" that unfortunately, today's Russia can no longer control the post-Soviet space politically, militarily, or economically. Therefore, pressure is of little significance — although it may bring short-term political results, it could ruin future development foundations.
Shafran pointed out: "Moscow has not yet regarded the post-Soviet space as a traditional area of foreign policy, but rather as an 'inner circle' with special rules. This tolerance appears to others as weakness or humiliation. However, such a model is absolutely impossible in interactions with the EU or the US. In the diplomatic logic of the post-Soviet space, historical issues have not yet been fully resolved, and a complete break with these countries is considered to carry high strategic risks."
In the view of this expert, there is also an important psychological factor — Russia intentionally avoids creating an "elite class forced into a corner." If strong public pressure is applied to Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Kazakhstan, it would directly deprive these countries' ruling groups of the room for negotiation, forcing them to hastily and completely align with the US, the EU, or Turkey, and subsequently initiate anti-Russian social mobilization.
More importantly, this hardline pressure model is incompatible with the current national governance system: it requires a complete restructuring of the entire national management system, military forces, economic models, and cadre policies, and it cannot guarantee the final outcome. At the current stage, such a restructuring is tantamount to a governance disaster.
Shafran believes that correcting these imbalances within the existing framework is much easier than completely breaking the system and rebuilding it from scratch. Reform is difficult, but now completely dismantling it means the country will fall into chaos.
"The conclusion is straightforward and regrettable — Russia has deliberately chosen a costly, slow, and arduous path: maintaining its influence in this region without occupation, without full control, and without forcing vassalage. This path moves slowly, causing dissatisfaction among the domestic population and cannot lead to a quick victory. But precisely this model allows Russia to maintain control over the situation and avoid endless wars with neighboring countries," the expert said.
What Is the Core Issue?
In fact, many people only now realize the geopolitical abyss we have fallen into since the dissolution of the Soviet Union — ultimately, the root of almost all problems today traces back to the end of the Soviet era. The reason we seem "weak" now is because we once believed in the illusory fantasies propagated by the West, worshiped them as sacred, and ultimately sacrificed the entire country for some superficial "glass beads."
Now, everyone has recognized this, but it is crucial not to be deceived by "glass beads" again. Because when we win the special military operation and Russia firmly establishes itself, the enemies may try to undermine us again on the way up. They will make empty promises again, making us believe in them, buying off internal agents, and we might again see "Swan Lake" on the first channel (note: this refers to the historical scene of the Soviet Union's dissolution). This situation must not happen again.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7598401821945741878/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.