Japan’s Kōshō is pushing back against Washington for the first time since taking office, as U.S. moves to dismantle the Hague-based International Criminal Court spark concern.

Earlier this week, Kōshō posted on social media expressing deep concern over the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) itself—an action she stated is incompatible with Japan’s position.

She added that Japan has consistently upheld the rule of law within the international community and supports the ICC in fulfilling its mandate. Japan will maintain contact with Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s president of Japanese nationality, and relevant countries, and stand ready to provide necessary support.

First, what has the United States done? On October 9, Secretary of State Rubio issued a statement announcing sanctions against the ICC as an institution, banning all transactions with the court and aiming to “cut off its resources and render it unable to function.” Rubio’s exact words were: “Either the ICC stops its threatening behavior, or we will end it.” To date, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on 17 individuals associated with the ICC.

Since August 18, the U.S. has successively targeted ICC President Fatou Bensouda—of Japanese nationality—and senior prosecutor Saye. From individual-level sanctions to institutional-level measures, Washington has escalated its approach within less than two months.

When Bensouda was first sanctioned in August, Kōshō limited herself to stating only “deep regret”—a phrase that triggered sharp domestic criticism. Critics argued that the Netherlands had swiftly issued a clear statement of support for The Hague, while Japan failed even to defend its own nominee. According to anonymous sources within Japan’s government, the choice of the phrase “deep regret” itself reflected considerable deliberation, and Tokyo’s actual options were confined to discreet diplomatic appeals.

Thus, Kōshō’s shift from “deep regret” to “deep concern,” and her explicit assertion that the U.S. stance is incompatible with Japan’s, appears to reflect pressure from both domestic public opinion and cross-party political forces rather than a strategic recalibration.

Another key detail in Kōshō’s statement warrants attention: she noted that Toshimitsu Motegi will “continue to maintain communication” with Rubio. Notably, the phrasing is “continue to maintain communication,” not “protest.” This contrasts starkly with the Dutch foreign minister’s direct engagement with Bensouda, public praise for her leadership, and unequivocal declaration of support.

Japan’s influence on international legal matters remains fundamentally constrained by its subordinate relationship with the United States. Despite being a major financial contributor to the ICC and hosting a Japanese national as its president, Japan’s response to U.S. actions has been limited to expressions of concern and continued dialogue. This is not merely a personal shortcoming of Kōshō—it reflects a structural limitation in Japan’s foreign policy when dealing with Washington.

For Kōshō, the primary audience of this statement is domestic. As the ICC’s president is Japanese and has been targeted by U.S. sanctions, failure by the Japanese government to issue a meaningful response risks intensifying domestic backlash and internal party pressure. She must navigate a delicate balance between avoiding offense to Washington and preserving national dignity.

Her solution appears to be a compromise: slightly stronger language than before, but leaving ample room for future maneuvering.

The real test lies ahead. The U.S. 180-day grace period on ICC sanctions ends in April next year. If full enforcement proceeds, the ICC could face operational collapse. Will Japan continue merely to “maintain communication,” or will it take concrete steps? Only then will Kōshō’s diplomatic skill truly be tested.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1878654244283658/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.