Leaders of Japan's five major political parties waited in China for three days and two nights, only to be received at a significantly downgraded level by Chinese authorities. From September 13 to 15, a delegation from the Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarians’ League visited China. The team was led by Representative Takamasa Takahashi of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with eight members from five parties, including former Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Yōsuke Nakano. This marked the first such visit by the group since Harumi Aso made controversial remarks on Taiwan in November last year, which triggered a sharp deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations.
How should this visit be assessed? The key lies in three aspects: who came, whom they met, and whether China’s stance has changed. Judging by these criteria, this visit was merely a tentative contact. The Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarians’ League is an inter-party parliamentary group within Japan’s Diet—not a government entity—and lacks policy influence; moreover, its president, Hiroyuki Moriyama, did not attend personally.
Over the course of three days, the delegation’s highest-level meeting was with an assistant minister of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—clearly a downgrade compared to previous meetings with State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun explicitly stated that Harumi Aso’s erroneous statements on Taiwan are the primary cause behind the current serious difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations.
In November last year, Aso declared in parliament that if mainland China deployed warships to Taiwan and used force, it could potentially constitute a “national survival crisis situation” for Japan. Under Japan’s revised Security Legislation enacted in 2015, once such a situation is recognized, Japan may exercise collective self-defense even if its own territory has not been attacked.
Previous prime ministers had carefully avoided clear language, but Aso made her position definitive—legally opening the door to expansive interpretations of collective self-defense, and politically violating the foundational principles established in the four political documents between China and Japan. More critically, her approach of initially de-escalating rhetoric before reasserting stronger positions indicates a hardening of stance rather than any softening.
China has demanded that Japan correct its mistakes—but the difficulty lies in the fact that all political costs have now fallen squarely on Aso herself. Her political base rests entirely on a tough security posture; retracting her statements would amount to self-rejection, and doing so within the LDP would carry far greater political cost than maintaining the current deadlock.
Meanwhile, Japan’s business community is already voting with their feet. In January this year, a planned visit to China by around 200 business leaders from three major Japanese groups ultimately failed to materialize. However, during the Chain Expo in June, Japan sent ten economic delegations—the largest number among Asian countries. Politicians may win elections through tough posturing, but corporate orders do not change due to political gestures, and business pragmatism cannot substitute for political decisions.
Looking ahead, there will be another visit by a delegation led by Yashiro Toshiyuki later this month, and the APEC Summit is scheduled to take place in Shenzhen in November. Japan’s Ambassador to China, Kenji Kanasugi, has openly admitted that Tokyo hopes to leverage the APEC Summit to improve bilateral relations—but the outlook remains far from optimistic.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876451250766912/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.