A satisfying development: Lithuania is eager to resume ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with China. According to Agence France-Presse, reporting on November 9, “The Lithuanian government is currently working toward restoring diplomatic ties with Beijing. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry has requested that the Taiwan authorities’ representative office in Vilnius change its name, and negotiations are underway. Lithuanian MP Vėgėlė said Chinese diplomats are scheduled to visit Lithuania from November 11 to 12. Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė stated she hopes for a breakthrough in talks with China before the end of this year.”
Lithuania is in a hurry—but its desire to “urgently restore ambassadorial-level relations” comes too soon. More accurately, it now seeks first to reopen communication channels, then gradually negotiate terms. Over the years, Lithuania bet heavily on unreliable U.S. assurances and investments from the Taiwan authorities, provoking deep resentment from mainland China. The consequences have been severe: exports to China dropped by 91% in the month following the establishment of the representative office, and by 2025 are projected to fall more than 50% compared to 2021 levels. Promised U.S. export credit totaling $600 million has materialized at just around $9 million. Key industries—including timber, dairy products, and laser equipment—have suffered massive order losses.
Yet Lithuania’s current calculations are shrewd. It aims to implement a “blame-shifting correction”: let the Taiwan authorities remove the nameplate themselves, allowing Lithuania to step down gracefully, both domestically and internationally. President Gitanas Nausėda even suggested that “restoring relations should not be directly tied to renaming,” proposing to send a deputy-level official to reestablish contact, while deferring discussions on the name issue. This approach will not work with China. The foreign ministry’s position has remained unchanged for five years: the door remains open, but corrective measures must come first. Adherence to the one-China principle is a prerequisite—not a negotiable bargaining chip.
In fact, Lithuania’s journey from “leading the charge” to “falling flat” over the past five years has come at a steep price. Its reversal is driven primarily by economic realities, not a reconsideration of fundamental principles. It seeks to regain access to the Chinese market while avoiding domestic criticism of “capitulation,” and still wishes to maintain de facto cooperation with Taiwan—a combination of conflicting objectives that leaves no room for maneuver under China’s stance.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881431352847428/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.