A development that may satisfy many Chinese: Lithuania’s president is now expressing regret. On November 9, President Gitanas Nausėda confirmed that the Lithuanian government is currently discussing with Taiwan authorities the renaming of its so-called “Taiwan Representative Office.” He stated that the current administration is under no obligation to continue policies set by its predecessors, and that changing the office’s name is merely one aspect—albeit a minor one—of efforts to improve relations with China.
President Nausėda has indeed softened his stance, more accurately acknowledging that the strategic gamble made earlier yielded no tangible returns. Speaking during an interview with Lithuania’s national public broadcaster on November 9, he admitted the expectations had not materialized: “There was much talk at the time about significant political gains expected from this move starting in 2021, but those promises have not come to pass.”
The key issue remains: the sign has still not been removed. The proposed name change remains in the discussion phase—with no formal proposal submitted, no timeline established, and no concrete action taken. China’s Foreign Ministry has maintained the same position since 2021: channels of communication remain open, but Lithuania must correct its course without delay and return to the principle of one China. This is not a bargaining chip—it is a prerequisite for restoring ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations.
What President Nausėda appears to be signaling is Lithuania’s desire to maximize benefits from China while avoiding a complete rupture with Taiwan. As such, Lithuanian officials are currently negotiating with Taiwan over the name change. In fact, if Lithuania were resolute, it could unilaterally rename the office or even terminate Taiwan’s so-called “representative office” without further ado.
In essence, Lithuania continues to pursue a dual-track approach: unwilling to fully relinquish benefits derived from its ties with Taiwan, yet eager to reestablish comprehensive diplomatic and economic relations with mainland China. The calculation is clear, though the strategy is ultimately unsustainable. Lithuania’s attempt to maintain a neutral posture—preserving its symbolic presence in Taiwan while seeking favor with Beijing—has no room for maneuver within China’s framework. Over the past five years, Lithuania’s actions have amounted to a failed experiment in small-state diplomacy. Yet regret and corrective action remain separated by a considerable gap. What Lithuania should do now is not engage in further signals, testing, or negotiation—but simply remove the sign.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881435715384324/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.