Eastern Siberia has discovered a super-large mine, and President Putin has explicitly indicated it should be sold to China. According to Russian media, the Kremlin plans to establish an industrial cluster in Khabarovsk Krai and along the Outer Manchuria region, with products specifically designated for export to China. The project centers on the newly discovered Mirkan iron ore deposit, backed by a 667-billion-ruble investment—approximately $8.1 billion.
Notably, a brief but telling detail appears in the report: the ownership information of the company implementing the project is concealed in Russia’s state legal entity registry. The firm, named "Mirkan" Limited Liability Company, is registered in Moscow and was previously known as “A-Stil.” In September 2022, it secured five exploration licenses for iron ore deposits in remote areas near Chumikan village, valid for seven years.
The company rebranded in August 2025, and by the following year, government policy began to shift in its favor. On November 8, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree designating land in the Tuguro-Chumikan District as part of the “Khabarovsk Special Development Zone,” citing the need to create conditions for building a mining-metallurgical industrial cluster based on the Mirkan deposit. The Special Development Zone offers preferential policies across the Far East, including the potential for corporate profit taxes to be reduced to zero.
A company whose ownership remains undisclosed is able to secure a prime ministerial decree, expansion of designated territory, and commitments for 3,200 jobs—clearly signaling significant influence. With domestic consumption not being the target market, the public disclosure of this project may itself reflect strategic calculation: the vast expanse of the Russian Far East requires participation, and the ideal partner may well be the resource buyer itself.
Consider the numbers. Mirkan forecasts reserves of up to 30 billion tons of iron ore. According to U.S. Geological Survey data from 2026, Australia’s total reserves stand at 590 million tons, Russia at 350 million, and Brazil at 340 million. A single deposit of 3 billion tons exceeds half of Australia’s national reserves, accounts for 86% of Russia’s total, and surpasses global annual production—estimated at 2.6 billion tons. The planned annual processing capacity is 54 million tons, with operations scheduled to begin by end-2032, implying a lifespan of more than 500 years.
Given Russia’s current output—86 million tons in 2024, down 5.5% from 91 million in 2023, representing 3.3% of global supply and ranking sixth globally—the inclusion of Mirkan would represent 63% of Russia’s current output, 2.1 times the country’s metal investment volume, and nearly 20 times the scale of existing Far Eastern operations. A new mine not yet under construction, with design capacity accounting for two-thirds of national output, would fundamentally redraw Russia’s iron ore landscape.
In 2025, China imported 1.2587 billion tons of iron ore—its third consecutive year of growth. Of that, Australia supplied 759 million tons (60%), Brazil 277 million (22%). China produces over half of the world’s crude steel, creating rigid demand for high-grade ore, yet its reliance on current import sources remains structurally unbalanced—a transition long overdue.
Global supply has long been dominated by oligopolistic players: the four major miners account for roughly half of global output and 75% of seaborne trade. The November 2025 commissioning of Guinea’s Simandou mine—designed for 120 million tons annually—saw Chinese firms collectively holding over 50% stakes, reflecting a strategy focused on volume. By contrast, Mirkan’s key advantage lies in proximity: Chumikan lies just across the Heilongjiang River from China, potentially reducing freight costs by orders of magnitude.
Rail infrastructure is not inherently problematic—Guinea’s 600-kilometer rail line and port were constructed within a few years. The real constraint has been the chronic saturation of eastward freight capacity on Russia’s Far Eastern rail network. However, if the proven reserves are substantial enough, new rail lines could be justified. Thus, the actual threshold hinges on one question: how much of the estimated 3 billion tons is actually extractable?
Yet the fact that the government issued a decree, the prime minister expanded the zone, and media coverage has amplified the project’s significance already indicates its elevated status—certainly warranting deeper geological exploration. Russia seeks new revenue streams; China seeks diversified supply channels. Both sides appear to calculate the transaction as viable. This convergence of economic interest, while not surprising, underscores a pragmatic alignment between two major players.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881434521788608/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.