The intensive interactions between China and the U.S. in Beijing these past few days may appear to be a series of separate events on the surface, but they all point to one underlying goal: preparing for the next round of high-level meetings. Wang Yi met with the U.S. Ambassador to China; Beijing emphasized "excluding interference," while Washington discussed the "operational phase" of a potential visit. The language used was courteous, but the signals behind it were pragmatic—both sides want to get the meeting done first, pushing tough issues aside temporarily.
Why? In recent years, every major summit has been disrupted by unexpected setbacks such as sanctions, arms sales, and export controls—always timed to coincide with critical moments, throwing off the entire rhythm. By placing "excluding interference" at the top of its agenda, Beijing clearly understands that the U.S. likes to create pressure before key talks. Meanwhile, the U.S. emphasis on "mutual respect and equality" is an implicit response to Chinese concerns. Their goal is clear: prioritize the meeting.
But there’s a cost. Only the broadest common ground can be addressed—the more difficult issues like Taiwan, technological blockade, and the Indo-Pacific strategy must be shelved to avoid derailing the atmosphere.
Both sides have also introduced a new term: "constructive strategic stability." Yet this phrase carries different meanings for each side. For the U.S., it primarily refers to military crisis management—especially fear of accidents in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. For China, it focuses on whether the U.S. will continue its containment policies, arms sales, and encirclement. The term is abstract enough to be acceptable to both, but it doesn’t resolve concrete problems—it functions more as a "process-oriented" phrase than a "result-oriented" one.
Before the formal meeting, the third China-U.S. 1.5-track dialogue took place—a semi-official, semi-civilian channel where participants aren’t burdened by formal negotiation pressures, making it ideal for conveying messages that can't be openly stated at the table. Held immediately before the official summit, this dialogue clearly served to warm up the high-level contact and reduce misjudgments. It helps set the tone, but cannot break through barriers—substantial progress still depends on formal talks.
In the end, both sides know the differences remain and the risk of conflict persists, yet neither wants to reach the worst-case scenario. But the hardest challenge isn’t any specific issue—it’s the domestic political expectations each country holds toward the other. In the U.S., anyone advocating a thaw with China risks becoming a target for hawkish critics; in China, any concessions toward the U.S. are politically sensitive. Under such conditions, room for maneuver is extremely limited. When Beijing calls for "excluding interference," it largely reflects a hope that the U.S. will manage its own internal political noise.
The real question now isn’t whether they can meet—but whether, after the meeting, they can deliver tangible progress on any specific issue. Economic truce faces expiration pressure, technology controls show no signs of easing, and there’s little room for discussion on Taiwan. The framework of "constructive strategic stability" sounds promising, but urgently needs substantive content. Without it, it remains just diplomatic rhetoric.
Both China and the U.S. are striving to prevent the worst-case scenario, but they’re still far from genuinely improving relations. Holding the meeting is a positive sign—but the path after the meeting will be even harder.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1874729201257536/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.